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Juridical Chameleons in the "New Erie" Canal 
Donald L. Doernberg* 
Federal law is no juridical chameleon, changmg complexion . It 
is found m the federal Constitution, statutes, or common law. Fed- 
eral common law implements the federal Constitution and statutes, 
and is conditioned by them.' 
- 
Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in D'Oench, Duhme & 
Co. v. FDIC2 is well known to all students of the federal courts. In 
the aftermath of Erce Railroad v. Tompk~ns,~ the federal courts4 
and commentators5 alike have struggled to understand Erce's im- 
plications. The struggle continues today. As Professor George 
Brown noted, "something is afoot with E r ~ e . " ~  
Erce is traditionally vlewed as based prunarily on concepts of 
federalism, seeklng to define the proper boundaries of state and 
* Copyright 0 1990, Donald L. Doernberg, Professor of Law, Pace Umversity. B.A., 
1966, Yale University; J.D., 1969, Columbla Umversity. The author m h e s  to acknowledge 
the thoughtful commenta of hls wife Cynthla A. Pope and of Professors Jay C. Carlisle and 
Barbara C. Salken on earlier drafts of this article. The author alao gratefully acknowledges 
the research and editing assistance of Jeffrey Hoerter and Samuel Mazen of the class of 
1991, and A m  Mane Collins, Jill Devme, Richard Ferrante, and Amy Schneider of the class 
of 1992. 
1. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942)(Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
2. See rd. a t  465-75. 
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
4. The Supreme Court later wrestled with Ene's suggestion that m diversity cases, 
matters of substance would be governed by state law and matters of procedure by federal 
law. See, e.g., Guaranty 'Rust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945)(for Erre purposes, statutes of 
limitations are substantive because they are outcome-deternative); Byrd v. Blue Ridge 
Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958)(three-part test subsumed Guaranty Trust's outcome-deter- 
mlnative test); Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965)(matters specifically dealt with m Fed- 
eral Rules of Civil Procedure are not subject to three-part test of Byrd). 
5. According to Professor Brown: "The [Ene] declsion ha8 spawned an enormous liter- 
ature and the 'Ene doctrule' has been called 'the central concern of an entire genera- 
tion of academc lawyers.' " Brown, Of Actiuzsm and Erie-The Implication Doctnne's Im- 
plications for the Nature and Role of the Federal Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617, 617 
(1984)(quoting Western & Lehman, Is There Life for Erle After the Death of Diversity?, 78 
MICH. L. REV. 311, 312 (1980)). 
6. Id. 
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federal law m federal court actions.? Recently, however, a new vl- 
sion of the Erze doctrine has emerged, characterizmg Erze as based 
not only on federalism, but also on the doctrme of separation of 
powers within the federal government. The "New Erze" doctrine 
compels a far more restricted role for the federal courts m making 
common law.8 
In Cannon v. Unzverszty of Chzcago: Justice Powell's dissent- 
ing opinion sketched out a broad vlew of separation of powers 
based on Erze that effectively would prevent federal courts from 
mplymg rights of action in statutes. Justice Powell argued that 
the judicial branch should not "assume policymaking authority 
vested by the Constitution in the Legislative Branch."l0 Other Jus- 
tices have jolned m t h s  vision, whch has come to stand for a very 
stark view of separation of powers that grants the federal courts 
little, if any, power to create common law.ll 
The New Erze doctrine, however, has become a doctrine of 
convenience, inconsistently applied by conservative and liberal 
Justices alike. It is the antithesis of a "neutral prmciple" of consti- 
tutional adjudication.12 To use Justice Jackson's term, the federal 
laws are not the "juridical chameleons"-the Justices are.lS Part I1 
of this Article discusses the old and the New Erze doctrmes as ar- 
ticulated by the United States Supreme Court. Part 111 demon- 
strates the difficulty of limiting the New Erze doctrme to the single 
area of implied rights of action and shows how the broad brush 
with which the doctrine's proponents pan t  necessarily touches 
other areas, including abstention, admiralty, antitrust, labor law 
and federal proprietary rights. Part IV catalogues how the Justices 
7. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 55, a t  355 (4th ed. 1983)(Ene "goes to the 
heart of the relations between the federal government and the states, and returns to the 
states a power that had for nearly a century been exercised by the federal government."). 
8. Some commentators refer to the separation of powers vlew of Ene as the "New 
Ene." See Brown, supra note 5, at 618. Thls Article follows that convention. 
9. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
10. Id. a t  743 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell also noted that as a matter of 
policy federal courts should avoid unplymg rights of action m statutes because "[rlather 
than confronting the hard political choices mvolved, Congress IS encouraged to shvk its 
constitutional obligation and leave the =sue to the courts to decide." Id. 
11. At one time or another all of the United States Supreme Court's recent members, 
Chef Justice Rehnqwt and Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, O'Connor, Powell, 
Scalia, Stevens and White, have articulated or subscribed to New Ene sentiments. See znfra 
Part IV 
12. See Wechsler, Toward Neutral Pnnczples of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. REV. 
1 (1959). 
13. D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 471-72 (1942)(Jackaon, J., 
concurr111g). 
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have changed thew colors by relylng on the New Erze doctrlne In 
some mstances but not even acknowledging its existence in other 
cases that are analytically indistmct. The Artlcle concludes with 
the suggestion that federal courts have considerable common law 
powers, whlch, rather than being mconsistent with separation of 
powers, actually function to make exerclses of congressional power 
more effective. Separation of powers is not offended when federal 
courts create common law, promded that these efforts are con- 
straned by expressions of policy in positlve law, the Constitut~on 
and federal statutes. Part V of this Article, therefore, offers a 
sharply modified mew of the New Erze aspect of the separation of 
powers doctrlne and briefly discusses the ramifications of its con- 
slstent application. 
Unfortunately, the members of the Court seem uninterested In 
doctrinal consistency when they resort to New Erze pr1nciples.l4 
When the Justices Ignore decisional rules in order to reach deslred 
results m particular cases, the law In general, and New Erze prlncl- 
ples in particular suffer. Ultimately, the institutional legitimacy of 
the Court suffers. 
11. THE EMERGENCE OF TWO Erze DOCTRINES 
A. The "Old" Erie 
To call Erze Railroad v. Tompkzns16 a landmark case certmly 
is to belittle its effect.16 It provoked extensive scholarly comment 
a t  the tlme and the flood of commentary has not dimlnlshed m the 
half century smce.17 Erze confronted anew the question of what law 
14. See Beermann, Bad Judicral Actiuzsm and Liberal Federal Courts Doctnne: A 
Comment on Professor Doernberg and Professor Redish, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1053 
(1990). Professor Beermann asserts that "the Court itself does not seem to care about sepa- 
ration of powers except insofar as i t  serves the Court's substantive goals." Id. a t  1056. Pro- 
fessor Beermann IS correct m h~ somewhat c p c a l  assertion. Indeed,  IS accuracy IS lrolllc 
because according to the proponents of the New Ene doctnne, it IS illegitimate for the 
Court even to have substantive goals. See rnfra notes 28-63 and accompanymg text. 
15. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
16. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 7,s 55, a t  355 ("It IS mpossible to overstate the mpor- 
tance of the Erre decision."). 
17. Several commentators wrote on Ene directly followmg the declslon. See, e.g., Dye, 
Development of the Doctnne of Erie Railroad v. Tomplans, 5 Mo. L. REV. 193 (1940)(&r 
Ene, the problem whether choice of law rules are part of state substantive law IS still unan- 
swered); Jessup, The Doctnne of Erle Railroad v. Tomplans Applied to International Law, 
33 AM. J. INT. L. 740 (1939)(the wdespread mterest m Ene compels examination of the new 
doctine's applicability to international law); Shulman, The Demzse of Swift v. Tyson, 47 
YALE L.J. 1336 (1938)("many a federal judge may writhe m pam at the prospect of h a w g  to 
follow 'the last breath' of state judges"); Zengel, The Effect of Ene Railroad v. Tomplans, 
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should apply in diversity cases. 
Almost 100 years before Erze, in 1842, a unanimous Court held 
in Swzft v. Tysonfs that the federal courts were bound to apply 
only state statutory law, not what Justice Brandeis characterized 
as "the unwritten law of the State as declared by its highest 
court."lo With respect to the unwritten law, the Swzft Court found 
that the federal courts "are free to exercise an independent judg- 
ment as to what the common law of the State is-or should be."a0 
In Erze, the Court rejected Swzft's expansive mew of federal courts' 
latitude to select the governing law in diversity cases and substi- 
tuted a restricted function of federal courts in such cases: 
Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts 
of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. 
And whether the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature 
m a statute or by its hghest court m a decision is not a matter of 
federal concern. There is no federal general common law. Congress 
has no power to declare substantive rules of common law applicable 
in a State whether they be local m then nature or "general," be they 
commercial law or a part of the law of torts. And no clause in the 
14 TUL. L. REV. 1 (1939)(constitutional aspect of Ene will cause mde repercuss~ons). 
Even today, Erze continues to prompt comment. See, e.g., Brown, Letting Statutory 
Tails Wag Constitutional Dogs-Have the Bivens Dissenters Prevailed?, 64 IND. L.J. 263 
(1989)(Ene rmed doubts about power of federal courts to make common law but vanous 
forms of federal common law have developed and flounshed smce Erze); Brown, supra note 
5, at 617 (the Powell-Rhenqtmt New Ene doctrme serves mportant mtitutional values); 
Chayes, Some Further Last Words on Erle, 87 WV. L. REV. 741 (1974)(a New Ene hae 
emerged as a potent counterforce to judicial activlsm m nonconstitutional domam); Ely, The 
Irrepressible Myth of Ene, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693 (1974)(mdely accepted new of Ene m- 
properly treats as a smgle command the Constitution, Rules of Declslon Act and Rules Ena- 
bling Act); Friendly, I n  Rarse of Erie--And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 383 (1964)(Justice Brandels blazed way for uniform federal common law on lssues of 
national concern); Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law (pt. I), 99 
HARV. L. REV. 883 (1986)(power to create federal common law IS much broader than gener- 
ally assumed, and despite Erze, state law rarely operates of its own force); Merrill, The 
Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1985)(there is much to be 
gamed from vlewmg all federal judicld lawmakmg as forms of federal common law); 
Mishlun, Some Further Last Words on Ene-The Thread, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1682 
(1974)(diitimctive constitutional limits on judicial power constitute the essential unity un- 
derlylng Erze); Wemberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. UL. REV. 805 (1989)(6fty-one years 
after Erze legitimacy and propriety of federal common law remam uncertam); Wemberg, 
The Cunous Notion That the Rules of Declsron Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common 
Law, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 860 (1989)(Ene did not take away federal courts' common law pow- 
ers); Amar, Law Story (Book Renew), 102 HARVARD L. REV. 688,694-700 (1989)(diicussmg 
separation-of-powers doctrme and Erze). 
18. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). 
19. Ene, 304 U.S. a t  71 (citing Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) a t  18). 
20. Id. (citing Swift, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 18). 
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Constitution purports to confer such a power upon the federal 
Justice Brandeis' majority opmion emphasized that the United 
States Constitution compelled the Court to overturn S ~ z f t . ~ ~  Erze, 
therefore, created de facto a presumption that state law would gov- 
ern in diversity cases unless displaced by constitutional command 
or congressional enactment m an area of federal cornpeten~e.~~ 
The Court was unanimous in reversing the result below, but 
not In overturning the Swzft doctrine. Justice Butler, jolned by 
Justice McReynolds, concurred on the ground that the record com- 
pelled a finding that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, thus 
barring recovery. He criticized the majority for rendering an un- 
necessary constitutional dec1sion.2~ Justice Reed concurred both in 
the result and in overruling Swzft, but argued that it  should be 
accomplished by revlsmg the Court's construction of the Rules of 
Decision Act to include state decisional law rather than by making 
what he, like Justice Butler, saw as an unnecessary constitutional 
decisi0n.2~ 
The Court, nonetheless, decided Erze on constitutional 
grounds. The majority oplnion is written in constitutional terms, 
and the concurrences by Justices Butler and Reed viewed the ma- 
jority opinion as declarmg constitutional principles. The exact 
scope of the constitutional aspect of the declsion IS, however, less 
clear than it  might be and Erze has been criticized on that basis.2B 
21. Id. a t  78. 
22. See rd. a t  79-80. Justice Brandels wrote: 
In disapproving [Swift] we do not hold unconstitutional 3 34 of the Federal Judiciary 
Act of 1789 or any other Act of Congress. We merely declare that m applymg the 
doctrme [of Swift] t b  Court and the lower courts have mvaded nghts whlch m our 
opmion are reserved by the Constitution to the several States. 
Id. 
23. The Ene Court treated the substantive area mvolved as entirely outside the power 
of the federal government. See rd. a t  78. See also rnfra notes 200-08 and accompanymg text 
(Erre not decided on separation of powers basis). 
24. See Ene, 304 U.S. a t  88 (Butler, J., concumng). According to Justice Butler, 
"[tlhere ls nothmg m the oplnlon to suggest that consideration of any constitutional ques- 
tion is necessary to a decls~on of the case." Id. 
25. See rd. a t  90-91 (Reed, J., concumng). 
26. For example, Professor Wnght argues: 
Perhaps no aspect of the Erre decls~on so perplexed the commentators for many years 
as [the statement of Swift v. Tyson's unconstitutionality]. Justice Brandels IS noted 
for hle ~nslstence that the Court refram from declding constitutional lssues if any 
other means of disposmg of the case IS available. Yet m Ene he seemed to go out of 
b way to reach the constitutional =sue 
There are other remarkable features of the constitutional discuselon m Ene. 
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The Court's language suggests that Erze is a "states' rights" deci- 
sion based on the limitations of the substantive grants of power to 
the federal government in the Constitution and of the concomitant 
reservation to the states of all powers not specifically given to the 
federal g~vernment.~? It appears that the Erze Court mtended gen- 
erally to prevent the federal courts from making substantive policy 
decisions that the Constitution left to the states. Some argue that 
Erze can be read even more broadly-as a decision concerned with 
the doctrine of separation of powers within the federal 
government. 
B. The "New" Erie 
While the "old" Erze was designed to keep the federal courts 
from intruding into areas committed to state concern, the New 
Erze demands that they not interfere with or make policy decisions 
committed by the Constitution to other branches of the federal 
government. Beginning m 1979, some Justices began to argue that 
Erze compels not merely appropriate federal judicial deference to 
state prerogatives, but also that federal courts refrain from making 
common law almost entirely 28 Thus, for New Erze theorists, if the 
[I]t was the Court's own conduct that was regarded as unconstitutional. A g m  
the Court does not say whch provision of the Constitution was vlolated by the doc- 
trme of Swift v. Tyson Presumably the reference ls to the Tenth Amendment, 
but it is unusual to have a constitutional declsion that avoids malang specific refer- 
ence to the constitutional promsion mvolved. No authority = cited for the constitu- 
tional arguments m the declsion except earlier dissents by Justices Field and Holmes, 
whlch are themselves quite cryptic as to why Swift v. Tyson is contrary to the Consti- 
tution. Finally Justice Brandeis fails to answer the argument of Justice Reed m h e  
concumng opmon that the Judiciary Article of the Constitution and the Necessary 
and Proper Clause of Article I may mdeed eve  Congress power to enact the substan- 
tive rules that are to be applied by the courts. 
C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, 3 56, at 359-60 (footnotes omitted). 
Another commentator argues: 
The rule of Swift was unconstitutional because i t  thrust the national government mto 
an area not assigned to it-the malang of general law. The Constitution sets up a 
national government of limited powers--essentially those enumerated m article I. 
The tenth amendment confirms thls understanding, and Brandels reaffirmed it when 
he declared that under Swift the federal courts had "invaded nghts whch m our 
opmon are resewed by the Constitution to the several States." 
Brown, supra note 5, a t  620 (footnote omitted). 
27. See supra notes 21-22 and accompany~ng text (quoting Justice Brandels' opmion 
m Erze). 
28. In Professor Brown's mew: 
A substantial block of the Court-probably four Justices-views the common-law 
powers of federal courts as extremely limited and stresses the prmacy of Congress m 
all matters of "lawmakmg." Thls judicial perspective ~s referred to as the "new Erze 
Heinonline - -  1990 Utah L. Rev. 764 1990 
No. 41 JURIDICAL CHAMELEONS 765 
subject matter is left to the states, there is no federal legislative or 
judicial common law power of any sort.20 In addition, if the subject 
matter is committed to the federal government, its mclusion in ar- 
ticle I and not article I11 demonstrates that Congress, not the fed- 
eral courts, should Bve meaning to the subject matter. Under this 
view, federal courts have little to do with federal law other than to 
apply congressional declarations of it. 
The breadth of this summary must be tempered, however, 
with the recognition that primary supporters have discussed this 
doctrme m only one type of case: judicial implication of private 
causes of action under federal statutes30 or constitutional prom- 
s ion~.~l  But the New Erze doctrme cannot be limited conceptually 
to that area of federal common law. Implication of private rights of 
action is only one of four distmct methods by which the federal 
courts have created federal common law.32 The terms m which the 
doctrine's proponents have staked out their territory cannot easily 
be limited to mplication of private remedies. Before examining the 
doctrine's full ramifications, however, its origms and theoretical 
underpmmgs, m the terms chosen by its advocates, must be 
considered. 
doctrme " Ene serves as a precedential touchstone for the proposition that fed- 
eral courts, unlike them state counterparts, are not true common-law courts. 
Brown, supra note 5, a t  625. 
29. An area ~s "left to the states" if it ~s not one of the enumerated areas that the 
federal government ~s explicitly even power by the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. I, 3 8. 
30. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 
(1982)(private cause of action mplied under Commodity Exchange Act); Califorma v. Sierra 
Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981)(no pnvate cause of action mplied under Rivers and Harbors Ap- 
propnation Act of 1899); U~uversities Research Ass'n v. Coutu, 450 U.S. 754 (1981)(no pn- 
vate cause of action mplied under Dam-Bacon Act); Transamer~ca Mortgage Adwors, Inc. 
v. Lem,  444 U.S. 11 (1979)(pnvate cause of action mplied under Investment Adwor's Act 
of 1940); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979)(no pr~vate cause of action 
lmplied under Securities Exchange Act of 1934); Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)(no pnvate 
cause of action mplied under 18 U.S.C. 3 610, a crmlnal statute whch prohibited corpora- 
tions from makmg contributions m connection with any election to political office). 
31. See, e.g., Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983)(when remedy ~s covered by compre- 
hens~ve procedural and substantive promlons, i t  IS mappropnate for courts to mply pnvate 
cause of action under the Constitution); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14, 41-44 (1980)(Rehn- 
q u t ,  J., dissenting)(argumg no pnvate cause of action may be mplied from any constitu- 
tional prom~on). 
32. See Friendly, supra note 17, a t  421. Judge fiendly wrote: 
[The Court] has employed a vanety of techn~ques- spontaneous generation as m the 
case of government contracts or rnterstate controvers~es, ~mplication of a pnvate fed- 
eral cause of action from a statute providing other sanctions, construng a jwd ic -  
tional grant as a command to fashon federal law, and the normal judic~al filling of 
statutory mteratices. 
Id. 
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Justice Powell's dissent in Cannon v. Unzversity of Chrcagoss 
may be regarded as the judicial birth of the New Erze d~ctrrne.~' 
Cannon was one of a series of cases in which litigants asked federal 
courts to Imply private rights of action under federal statutes that 
did not create them explicitly s5 Federal courts have implied pri- 
vate actions in statutes for many years.se In 1975, Cort v. Ash rede- 
fined the criteria for implylng such actions:s7 
In determmmg whether a private remedy is Implicit m a statute not 
expressly provlding one, several factors are relevant. First, does 
the statute create a federal right m favor of the plantiff? Second, is 
there any mdication of le~slative mtent, explicit or implicit, either 
to create such a remedy or to deny one? Thud, is it consistent with 
the underlying purposes of the legislative scheme to imply such a 
remedy for the plantiff? And finally, is the cause of action one tra- 
ditionally relegated to state law, m an area basically the concern of 
the States, so that i t  would be mappropriate to mfer a cause of ac- 
tion based solely on federal law?s8 
In Cannon, Justice Powell argued that Cort opened the floodgates 
for federal court implication of private rights of action.SB Other 
Justices, however, have mewed Cort as restrictrng such implica- 
tion~.'~ Regardless of whether Cort expanded or contracted judicial 
33. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
34. There are antecedents that mght also serve as a starting pomt for the New Ene 
doctnne, but they do not cite the Ene decision as their source. For example, m Bivens v. Si 
Unknown Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), three Justices dissented 
on separation of powers grounds, finding the Court's opuuon "an exercise of power that the 
Constitution does not.@ve us," td. a t  428 (Black, J., dissenting), and "judicial legulation," 
td. a t  430 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Court has routinely condemned "judicial leg&- 
tion." See, e.g., Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hi, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978)(courta should not 
we~gh msdom of statutes); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517, 522 (1942)(refernng to 
"the stigma of judicial legmlation"). 
35. See supra note 30. Requests for rmplication of prrvate nghts of action also arme, 
but less frequently, with respect to constitutional entitlements. See supra note 31. 
36. See, e.g., Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916)(private cause of action 
unplied under Safety Appliance Act); Hayes v. Michgan Cent. R.R., 111 U.S. 228 
(1884)(private cause of action unplied under Chcago railroad safety ordinance); see also 
Zeigler, Rights Requzre Remedies: A New Approach to the Enforcement of Rights an the 
Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 665, 676 (1987)("After Rigsby, the federal courta often 
allowed or 'implied' remedies for violations of statutory duties when the statute did not 
explicitly authorize a private nght of action."). 
37. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
38. Id. a t  78 (citations omitted). 
39. See Cannon v. University of Chcago, 441 U.S. 677, 740-41 (1979)(Powell, J., 
dissenting). 
40. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cman, 456 U.S. 353, 374-75 
(1982). In Merrill Lynch, Justice Stevens ~omed by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall and 
Blackmun observed: 
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latitude, Justice Powell sounded a powerful call m Cannon for re- 
evaluation of the practice of implylng private rights of action: 
[A]s mounting evldence from the courts below suggests, and the de- 
clsion of the Court today demonstrates, the mode of analysis we 
have applied m the recent past cannot be squared with the doctrme 
of the separation of powers. The time has come to reapprase our 
standards for the judicial implication of private causes of action. 
In recent hstory, the Court has tended to stray from the Art. 
111 and separation-of-powers prmciple of limited jurisdiction. 
The "four factor" analysis [of Cort v. Ash] is an open Invitation to 
federal courts to legslate causes of action not authorized by Con- 
gress. It is an analys~s not faithful to constitutional principles and 
should be rejected. Absent the most compelling evldence of &ma- 
tive congressional mtent, a federal court should not Infer a private 
cause of action." 
Although Justice Powell limited h s  speciflc demand to ending ju- 
dicial creation of causes of action, the doctrlne he articulated and 
the bases on which he founded it have much broader implications 
for the role of the federal courts. 
Justice Powell based h s  objection to judicial implication of 
private rights of action on his vlew of separation of powers. He saw 
the existing implication doctrlne as a judicial usurpation of Con- 
gress' policymakrng authority and decried that development be- 
cause of what he saw as its anti-democratic tendencie~.~~ Justice 
Powell thus embraced a very limited view of federal judicial power 
to create private causes of action where Congress has failed to pro- 
vide explicitly for them. He did not, however, entlrely rule out the 
When federal statutes were less comprehensive, the Court applied a relatively smple 
test to determme the availabiity of an mplied pnvate remedy. If a statute was en- 
acted for the benefit of a speclal class, the pdiclary normally recogmed a remedy for 
members of that class Under thls approach, federal courts, followmg a com- 
mon-law tradition, regarded the denlal of a remedy as the exception rather than the 
rule. 
Id. (citation omitted). See also Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582, 636 
(1983)(Stevens, J., diisenting)(mplication 18 the rule, rather than the exception); Middlesex 
County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1, 25 (198l)(Stevens, J., 
concumng m part and dissenting m part)(% 1975, m Cort v. Ash, the Court cut back 
on the smple common-law presumption by fashlonmg a four-factor formula"). Therefore, 
Justices Stevens, Brennan and Blackmun vlew Cort as resbcting federal courts' mplication 
powers. 
41. Cannon, 441 U.S. a t  730-31 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
42. See zd. at  743. Justice Powell wrote that by h a n g  the pdiclary make policy decl- 
alons, "the public generally IS denled the benefits that are derlved from the m h g  of m- 
portant socletal cholces through the open debate of the democratic process!' Id. 
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possibility of such 1mplications.4~ 
Justice Rehnquist contributed to the development of the New 
Erze doctrme with his dissent m Carlson v. Green44 and his major- 
ity opinion in City of Milwaukee v. Illin0zs.4~ In Carlson, the ma- 
jority implied a federal cause of action in the eighth amendment 
on behalf of the heirs of a federal prisoner alleged to have been 
intentionally deprived of adequate medical care because of racial 
an im~s .4~ Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist argued that for the Court 
to imply a private civil damages remedy in the eighth amendment 
or any other constitutional provision, is " 'an exercise of power that 
the constitution does not give us' . The creation of such reme- 
dies is a task that is more appropriately vlewed as falling withn 
the legislat~ve sphere of author it^."^' Justice Rehnquist, thus, 
would not permit the implication of a private cause of action under 
a constitutional provision in any c~rcumstances. In contrast, Jus- 
tice Powell's dissent m Cannon contemplated at  least a limited 
possibility of implymg a private cause of action under a federal 
statuteP8 
In Carlson, Justice Rehnqust based his argument more di- 
rectly on Erze than had Justice Powell m Cannon. According to 
Chief Justice Rehnquist, "Erze expressly rejected the vlew, previ- 
ously adopted in Swzft v. Tyson, . that federal courts may de- 
43. For example, m Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Sew. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), al- 
though finding no mplied nght of action, Justice Powell explicitly recogmzed the possibility 
of domg so if congressional Intent to have a remedial scheme were demonstrated. See rd. at 
609; see also Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S. 1 
(1981)(key to the usue whether private nght of action mplicitly IS created u mtent of Con- 
gress); Transamenca Mortgage Advlsors, Inc. v. Lem,  444 U.S. 11 (1979)(Powell, J., concur- 
rmg)(jommg majority's opmion finding an mplied private nght of action under Investment 
Advlsors Act). 
44. 446 U.S. 14 (1980). 
45. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
46. See Carlson, 446 U.S. at 18-19. Ironically, though Justice Powell disagreed with 
much of the Court's language, he concurred m the judgment, thus finding it  appropriate for 
the federal courts m some cucumstances to mply rights of action under constitutional pro- 
visions. See rd. at  28 (Powell, J., concurrmg). 
47. Id. at 34 (Rehnqust, J., dissenting)(quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics 
Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 428 (1971)(Black, J., dissenting)). 
48. See Cannon v. University of Chlcago, 441 U.S. 677,749 (1979)(Powell, J., dissent- 
mg). Justice Powell wrote, "Henceforth, we should not condone the mplication of any pn- 
vate action from a federal statute absent the most compelling evldence that Congress m fact 
mtended such an action to exlst." Id. 
It ~s unclear whether Justice Rehnqulst thought that Justice Powell's Cannon dissent 
did not go far enough or if he vlewed mplication under constitutional provlaions as analyti- 
cally distinct from mplication under statutory provisions. In  IS dissent m Carlson, Justice 
Rehnqmt did not cite Justice Powell's dissenting opmion m Cannon. 
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clare rules of general common law in civil fields."49 He concluded 
that unless Congress specifically has directed the courts to create 
remedies that Congress might othermse have created, courts over- 
step their constitutional bounds by dolng so.60 In his mew, separa- 
tion of powers cannot countenance such judicial activism. 
In City of Milwaukee v. I l l i n ~ z s , ~ ~  the mews expressed in Jus- 
tice Rehnquist's Carlson dissent acheved majority support. The 
Court struck down a premously-created federal common-law cause 
of action under a federal water pollution statute because Congress 
had left no room for such implication m the extensive legi~lation.~~ 
The Court applied Justice Rehnquist's Erze reasoning from Carl- 
son to reach that result. In so doing, the Court apparently united 
what could be mewed as separate branches of the New Erze doc- 
trine set out in Cannon, a statutory implication case, and in Carl- 
son, a constitutional implication case. In Milwaukee, Justice Rehn- 
qus t  contrasted the federal courts with their state counterparts, 
concentrating on the limitations of the former as common law 
courts and explicitly crediting Erze with defining those limits.63 
49. Carlson, 446 U.S. a t  37-38 (Rehnqulet, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnqmt also re- 
lied on an antecedent case 'denying federal courts the power to "create a common law of 
crmes." Id. at 38 (citing United States v. Hudson & Goodwm, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 
(1812)). 
It IS possible to mew Ene m a more limited light. Strlctly speakmg, Ene addressed only 
the ~mproprlety of federal courts makmg common law m areas committed by the Constitu- 
tion to the states. Erce did not address the propnety of creating-federal common law m 
areas where power IS delegated by the Constitution to the federal government. The Court 
mplicitly recognlzed thu when it adopted state law as the appropnate federal rule for es- 
tablishmg the relative pnority of federal loan program liens and private licenses m United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,727 (1979). The Kimbell Foods Court wrote that 
" 'in an area comprlsmg isues substantively related to an established program of goverment 
operation' federal courts [are] to fill the mterstices of federal 1ee;lslation according to 
them own standards.' " Id. a t  727 (quotimg United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 
412 U.S. 580, 593 (1973); Clearfield k t  Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 367 (1943)). 
Justice Rehnqulet jomed the Kimbell Foods u n m o u s  declslon. 
50. See Carlson, 446 U.S. a t  41-44 (Rehnqmt, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnqulet dis- 
t i n p h e d  the mplication of remedies a t  law from "[tlhe broad power of federal courts to 
grant equitable relief for constitutional molations," mewmg that power as "long estab- 
lished." Id. a t  42 (emphasls added). 
51. 451 U.S. 304 (1981). 
52. See cd. a t  317. 
53. See rd. a t  312-13. Chef Justice Rehnqmt's contrast was as follows: 
Federal courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not 
possess a general power to develop and apply theu own rules of decilon. The enact- 
ment of a federal rule m an area of national concern, and the declsion whether to 
diiplace state law m domg so, i generally made not by the federal judiciary, purpose- 
fully insulated from democratic pressures, but by the people through thew elected 
representatives m Congress. Ene recognlzed as much m ruling that a federal court 
could not generally apply a federal rule of declslon, despite the existence of junsdic- 
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Justice Rehnqwst, however, acknowledged that the federal courts 
on some occasions create common law, but he ascribed such occa- 
sions as necessary m areas involving conflict between federal policy 
and state law.64 Thus, by the end of 1981, the New Erze doctrine 
characterized the federal courts as hamng drastically limited com- 
mon-law powers to imply private rights of action in either statu- 
tory or constitutional promsions. The doctrine's proponents, how- 
ever, have explicated it m such broad terms that it cannot logically 
be confined to mplied rights of action. 
111. THE NEW Erze: BEYOND I~LICATION 
The proponents of the separation-of-powers mew of Erze argue 
their vision in very broad terms. On its face, thelr theory denies 
the legitimacy of creating any federal common law on a principled 
basis. If separation-of-powers principles prohibit the federal courts 
from m&ng policy decisions, then they must never make such de- 
cisions, Justice Rehnquist's view of necessity notwithstanding. Ex- 
pediency is understandable, but it is not a constitutional underpin- 
ning. One can readily anticipate Justices Powell and Rehnqwst, 
when faced with a request for implication of a necessary private 
right of action, replymg that necessity is a matter for the policy- 
making branches of the government, primarily the Congress. It is 
not unrealistic to envision them penning the sentence, "necessity 
cannot confer powers on the federal courts that the Constitution 
does not." 
Although the cases in which the New Erze has been ex- 
pounded all involved mplying private rights of action, Justice 
tion, m the absence of an applicable Act of Congress. 
Id. (citations omitted). The Milwaukee majority's reading of Ene IS a much broader reading 
than the language of Erre supports. Ene treated the substantive area mvolved as one m 
whlch Congress had no power to legmlate, it h a n g  been left by the Constitution to the 
states. See supra note 23. Rather than w e m g  congressional action as a condition precedent 
for the creation of common law, Ene, therefore, can be read to provlde only that federal 
courts cannot create common law m the absence of federal substantive power m the particu- 
lar subject area Indeed, Justice Rehnqmt asserted m Milwaukee that if Congress had ac- 
ted, there would be no need for the creation of common law. See Milwaukee, 451 U.S. at 
314. Between the asserted lmpropnety of federal common law m areas where Congress has 
not acted, and i t .  superfluousness when Congress has, the residual range for federal common 
law arguably IS rather narrow. 
54. See Milwaukee, 451 U.S. a t  313. The Milwaukee majority did not, however, ex- 
p h  how judicial lawmalung forbidden by the doctrme of separation of powers becomes 
constitutionally pemssible as a " 'necessary expedient' " when Congress fails to act. Id. at 
314 (quoting Committee for Consideration of Jones Falls Sewage Sys. v. Tram, 539 F.2d 
1006, 1008 (4th Cir. 1976)(en banc)). 
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Rehnquist's broad statements in Milwaukee about the limits of the 
federal judicial role cannot easily be confined to such cases. Fed- 
eral common law, he wrote, "is resorted to '[iln absence of an ap- 
plicable Act of Congress' and because the Court is compelled to 
consider federal questions 'wluch cannot be answered from federal 
statutes alone.' "s6 Although Justice Rehnqust .was apparently un- 
willing to dispense entlrely with the common-law role of the fed- 
eral courts, he sharply limited their ambit m dealing with unset- 
tled questions: "[Ilt is for Congress, not federal courts, to 
articulate the appropriate standards to be applied as a matter of 
federal law."66 This doctrine dictates that the federal courts may 
not create common law except when absolutely necessary; other- 
mse they usurp the powers of Congress and fail to "respect . 
the central role of the legislature m the formulation of federal 
Justice Powell certamly would have agreed with that narrow 
v ~ e w . ~ ~  Although Cannon v. Unzuerszty of Chzcagoss concerned only 
implication of a private cause of action from a federal statute, Jus- 
tice Powell spoke in much broader terms as he articulated lus vlew 
of separat~on of powers. He quoted extensively from Tennessee 
Valley Authorzty v. Hill,eo a case decided the year before Cannon 
that did not mvolve implication. 
While "[ilt is emphatically the provlnce and duty of the judicial de- 
partment to say what the law is .," it  is equally-and emphati- 
cally-the exclusive provlnce of the Congress not only to formulate 
leg~slative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to 
55. Id. a t  314 (quoting Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363,367 (1943); 
DIOench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,469 (1942)(Jackson, J., concumg)). 
56. Id. a t  317. It B possible that Justice Rehnquist would have been unable to mam- 
tcun a majority if he had written the Milwaukee opuuon so broadly as to rule out any possl- 
b i t y  of federal court common-law policymaIung. Justice Rehnqulstls mew may not, how- 
ever, be severe enough. Theoretically, an absence of federal law m an area does not compel 
courts to supply that law. The Court might acknowledge the desuabiity of federal law relat- 
mg to a particular polnt and take the position that its absence does not reqwe judicial 
creation of it. Thus, a clamant who asserts that an implied nght of action IS necessary to 
the federal scheme might be told, as Justice Powell would have done m Cannon, to take the 
matter up with the legulature. Similarly, a litigant requesting the creation of federal com- 
mon law to establish a defense mght be found liable while bemg adrnonlshed to refer the 
question to the political branches, as Justice Brennan would have done m Boyle v. United 
Techno1oe;les Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
57. P. BATOR, D. MELTZER, P. ~~ISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL 
COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 860 (3d ed. 1988)[heremafter HART & WECHSLER]. 
58. See supra note 10 and accompanymg text. 
59. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
60. 437 U.S. 153 (1978). 
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establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Congress, exer- 
cismg its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities m a 
given area, it 1s for the Executive to admmlster the laws and for the 
courts to enforce them when enforcement 1s sought. 
Our mdividual apprasal of the msdom or unmsdom of a partic- 
ular course consciously selected by the Congress is to be put aside m 
the process of mterpreting a statute. Once the meaning of an enact- 
ment 1s discerned and its constitutionality determined, the judicial 
process comes to an end.e1 
Justice Powell's broad expression is not limited, either literally or 
conceptually, to the narrow question of whether federal courts may 
mply private rights of action m statutes. 
Scholars supporting Justice Powell similarly do not advocate 
the New Erze in terms that would apply only to the mplication of 
private rlghts of action. For example, Professor Brown, though lim- 
iting the bulk of his discussion to implied rights, also argues the 
New Erze vision m broader terms: "[Tlhe Powell-Rehnquist retreat 
from judicial activism serves important mstitutional values, espe- 
cially the primacy of Congress as the policy-making branch of the 
national g~vernment."~~ Significantly, Professor Brown character- 
izes the Justices' approach in similarly sweeping terms,B3 and he is 
not alone in his mew. Professor Redish, though not characterizing 
hmself as a New Erze expositor, forcefully advances Justice Pow- 
ell's underlying thesis, arguing that "[slhort of a finding of consti- 
tutional mnvalidity, it is democratically illegitimate for an unrepre- 
sentative judiciary to overrule, circumvent, or ignore policy choices 
made by the majoritanan branches."64 Thus, the New Erze doc- 
trine, as construed by the Justices who have embraced it and the 
scholars who have explored it, is based on a compartmentalized 
61. Cannon, 441 U.S. at 744-45 (Powell, J., dissenting)(quoting Tennessee Valley Au- 
thority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194-95 (1978)). 
62. Brown, supra note 5, a t  618. 
63. See supra note 28. 
64. See Redish, Federal Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive 
Process: An "htitutiomllst" Perspective, 83 Nw. UL. REV. 761,764 (1989). Professor Rad- 
u h  concludes that: 
[Ilssues not controlled by the Constitution-mcluding those nonconstitutional lssues 
mvolvlng judicld jurrsdiction-are to be resolved on the basls of judicial policy as- 
sessment only to the extent the representative branches have not already made that 
policy cho~ce through legdative action. The political theory underlying the m- 
stitutionalist perspective, however, morally and logically dictates that judic~al use of 
such a practice be the last resort. 
Id. a t  768-69. 
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vlew of the branches of the federal government. Policy choices, it 
seems, are the exclusive provlnce of the democratic branches-the 
legislature and executive-not of the courts, which were designed 
by the framers as institutions free from majoritarian pressures.s6 
One would expect to see adherents of the New Erte steadfastly 
refusing to create common law, particularly where Congress has 
addressed the area of concern, and to see the doctrine's judicial 
detractors argulng that the creation of common law is not an usur- 
pation of legislative power. The Court's members, however, do not 
always characterize, or perhaps recognize, problems facing the 
Court m New Erze terms. Although judicial discussion of the doc- 
trine has focused primarily on implied rights of action, Congress 
expresses policy decisions in many ways other than by creating or 
declining to create new causes of action. To evaluate the Justices' 
consistency vis-8-vls the New Erze, it 1s necessary to consider some 
of the other areas in whch the doctrine, if it is legitimate, must be 
applied. 
A. Jurtsdictton and Abstentton 
The Court's assumption of policy-making authority m the area 
of jurisdiction and abstention directly conflicts with New Erte 
principles. The Court's activlsm is particularly noteworthy here be- 
cause it is led by the same Justices who argue the New Erze doc- 
trine most strongly. The jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts 
is established, within the limits of the Constitution, by Congres~.~~ 
65. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, a t  521 (A Harnilton)(J. Cooke ed. 1961); see ako City 
of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304,312-13 (198l)(federal judiciary purposefully msulated 
from democratic pressures); Furman v. Geor~a,  408 U.S. 238,466 (1972)(Rehnqulst, J., dis- 
senting)(members of federal judic~ary are constitutionally msulated from responsiveness to 
popular will). For more discuss~on on the mdependence of the judic~ary from policy deliber- 
ations, see C. BEARD, THE ENDURING FEDERALIST 330 (1959); W. BERNS, TAKING THE CONSTI- 
TUTION SERIOUSLY 200-04 (1987); L. TRIBE, CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 48-50, 84 (1985). 
66. Article m, 3 2 sets the outer limits of federal jurisdiction: 
The judic~al Power shall extend to all Cases, m Law and Equity, arumg under t h s  
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or whch shall be 
made, under them Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Min- 
~ t e r s  and Consulq-to all Cases of adrmralty and maritime Jurisdiction;-to Contro- 
versies to whch the United States shall be a Party;-to Controvers~es between two or 
more States;-between a State and Citizens of another State,-between Citizens of 
diierent States;-between Citizens of the same State chmmg Lands under Grants of 
different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and fore~gn States, Citi- 
zens or Subjects. 
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Mimsters and Consuls, and 
those m whch a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have ongmal Jur~dic-  
tion. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate 
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Despite the clarity of those jurlsdictlonal grants m abstentlon con- 
texts:' for nearly half a century the Supreme Court has led the 
federal courts in refusmg to accept junsdictlon In some categorles 
of cases, based on the Court's perception of policles that make the 
exerclse of federal junsdictlon madvlsable. 
The Court has created several categorles of federal absten- 
tlon.B8 Each abstention doctrlne is based on the Court's perception 
of policy deszderata that have somehow escaped the attention of 
Congress. For example, Younger abstentlon ostensibly promotes 
the values of federalism: "[Tlhe Natlonal Government, anxlous 
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and fed- 
eral mterests, always endeavors to do so m ways that will not un- 
duly mterfere with the legitmate actlvitles of the  state^."^^ Yet, 
the Younger Court did not discuss what provlslons of the Constitu- 
tlon allocated that "endeavor" to the federal judiciary 
For the New Erze theorlst, abstentlon poses a severe prob- 
lem.?O Younger abstentlon IS perhaps the most troublesome be- 
cause Congress has directly dealt with the subject matter ordina- 
rily mvolved ln Younger abstention cases: state vlolatrons of 
federal constitutional r~ghts.?~ Congress has addressed the subject 
Junsdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regula- 
tions as the Congress shall make. 
U.S. CONST. art. IU, 5 2. Congress has implemented the constitutional granta m, znter alia, 
28 U.S.C. 53 1330-38, 1343, 1345 (1988). 
67. It ~s not suggested that federal jurisdictional grants are clear as a general matter; 
litigation and scholarship over the years demonstrate that they are not, In cases presenting 
abstention questions, however, jumdiction w almost mvanably easy to establish. 
68. The abstention categories are: Pullman, Burford, Thibodaux, Younger, and Colo- 
rado River Each ~s assoclated with the name of the case that brought it to prommence. See 
Railroad Comm'n of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 
U.S. 315 (1943); Lomslana Power & Llght Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); 
Younger v. Hams, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The abstention doctme now assoclated with Younger actually 
ongmated m I n  re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888). See Zelgler, An Accommodation of the 
Younger Doctnne and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enforce Constitutional Safe- 
guards zn the State Cnmrnal Process, 125 U. P a  L. REV. 266, 270-71 & 11.23 (1976). 
69. Younger, 401 U.S. a t  44. 
70. Professor Redish, though not articulating hie thesls as the New Erre, suggested 
that the problem 1s moluble. See Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Lzm- 
its of the Judiczal Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71 (1984). In fact, he sees abstention as particu- 
larly egresous from the New Ene perspective: "To the extent that there are differences 
between judge-made abstention and judicd creation of federal common law, the former will 
usually constitute a greater departure from accepted separation-of-powers pmclples." Id. at 
84. 
71. Doernberg, "You Can Lead a Horse to Water ''. The Supreme Court's Refusal 
to Allow the Exerclse of Ongznal Junsdiction Conferred by Congress, 40 CASE W. h a .  L. 
REV. 999 (1990); Redish, supra note 70, at 71 ("[Tlhe abstention doctmes have most often 
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in two ways: first, by providing for special federal jurisdiction in 
civil rights cases; and, second, by makrng the basic civil rights stat- 
ute's cause of action an exception to the congressionally-mandated 
abstention doctrine embodied in the Anti-Injunction Be- 
cause Congress has addressed the problem of federal court absten- 
tion in several statutes, one might ask New Erze proponents why it 
is proper for the judicial branch to assume policymaking authority 
vested by the Constitution in the legislative branch. Perhaps the 
question can be answered, but it surely must be asked. 
Other abstention doctrines may be analyzed sunilarly for New 
Erre purposes; they differ only in the particular policies that the 
Court declares. Pullman abstention, for example, seeks to serve 
three goals: the obligation of federal courts to decide cases within 
their jurisdiction, the avoidance of constitutional decisions when 
possible, and the limitation of conilict between the federal and 
state systems.7s Burford abstention seeks "to avoid needless con- 
flict with the administration by a state of its own aff~urs."~~ The 
Thibodaux doctrine admonishes the federal courts to avoid adjudi- 
cating matters "of a special and peculiar nature lnt~mately in- 
volved with sovereign prer~gative."~~ Finally, Colorado Rzver ab- 
stention disdmns parallel federal and state proceedings "to avoid 
possible harassment or the duplication of effort."76 Irrespective of 
thelr goals, the abstention doctrines77 pose a common problem for 
been applied m cases involung only the federal courts' clvil r~ghts junsdiction."). 
72. See 28 U.S.C. 3 1343 (1988)(iur1sdiction for civil rlghts cases); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 
(1988)(pr~vate cause of action); 28 U.S.C. 8 2283 (1988)(exception to abstention); see also 
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 225 (1972)(declarmg § 1983 actions fall under "expressly 
authorized by Act of Congress" exception to Congress' general policy of non-mterference 
with state actions as expressed m Anti-Injunction Act). 
73. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, 8 52, at 303-07. 
74. Id. 5 52, a t  307. 
75. Loumana Llght & Power Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 28 (1959). 
76. M. &DISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS I  THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 
298 (2d ed. 1990). 
77. Separation of powers questions similar to those surrounding abstention are rmed 
by the Court's creation of the political question doctrme. See, e.g., Coleman v. Miller, 307 
U.S. 433 (1939)(state ratification of constitutional amendment held nonjustic~able); Luther 
v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849)(refusal to adjudicate case brought under guaranty 
clause, U.S. CONST. art. N, 8 4); Holtzman v. Schlesmger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. 
dented, 416 U.S. 936 (1974)(legality of Nixon Admlwtration's decwon to bomb Cambodia 
durlng Vietnam war held nonjusticmble). Separation of powers lssues also arue regarding 
courta' varlous "prudential" bases for denylng standing to sue. See, e.g., Allen v. Wnght, 468 
U.S. 737 (1984)(reqwrmg p h t i f P s  W r e s t  to fall w i t h  the "zone of mterests" mtended 
to be protected by law mvolved); Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 
(1976)(requmg p h t i f f s  to show-that mjury suffered would be remedied by favorable decl- 
slon); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)(requmg phtifTs' clams to be based on,theu 
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New Erze purposes: whether Congress or the judiciary is the appro- 
priate institution to set and pursue those policy goals.78 
B. Statutes of Lzmztatzon 
Statutes of limitation also exemplify the creation of federal 
common law, and New Erze proponents have endorsed thls exer- 
clse of judicial lawmaking. Federal causes of action frequently lack 
legdatively prescribed statutes of limitation, and the federal 
courts have taken up the burden of providing them. In DelCostello 
v. Internatzonal Brotherhood of Teamsters,7O Just~ce Brennan re- 
vlewed this practice: 
[W]e do not ordinarily assume that Congress intended that there be 
no time limit on actions at all; rather, our task is to "borrow" the 
most suitable statute or other rule of timeliness from some other 
source. We have generally concluded that Congress Intended that 
the courts apply the most closely analogous statute of limitations 
under state law. 
[W]e do so as a matter of interstitial fashioning of remedial 
details under the respective substantive federal statutes, and not be- 
cause the Rules of Decision Act or the Erze doctr~ne requires it.80 
The legitmacy of the federal courts' practice is perhaps not as 
clear-cut as Justice Brennan implies. Justices Stevens and 
O'Connor dissented in DelCostello, argcung that Erze and the 
Rules of Decision Act did require the use of state limitations peri- 
ods and forbade creation of a federal t m e  limit.s1 The members of 
own legal mterests, not those of thud parties). Both the Supreme Court's political question 
doctnne and its prudential limitations on standing may be mewed as forms of abstention, 
though they are not discussed rn those terms. In both situations, the Court dec~des for pol- 
~ c y  reasons not to entertam cases over whch it  clearly has jurudiction. Thus, the Court 
emerges as a policymaker. 
78. Thls IS the "legal process" approach. See Amar, supra note 17, at 691. Amar 
writes, "[Tlhe legal process school focuses pnmary attention on who is, or ought, to make a 
Dven legal decis~on, and how that decis~on IS, or ought, to be made." Id. The legal process 
approach underlies the New Ene doctnne. 
79. 462 U.S. 151 (1983). 
80. Id. at 158, 159 11.13 (citing Holmberg v. Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 394-95 (1946)). 
81. See zd. at 173-74 (Stevens, J., dissenting); zd. at  17475 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
Justices Stevens and O'Connor presented both New Ene and old Ene concerns. First, they 
argued that the Rules of Decmon Act compelled application of state law unless that law was 
displaced. See zd. at  173 (Stevens, J., dissenting); zd. at 174 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Be- 
cause i t  is grounded rn notions of federalism, t h ~ ~  IS an old Ene (federalism) argument. 
Second, they argued that if displacement were to occur, Congress was the appropriate body 
to effect it. See zd. a t  174 (Stevens. J., dissenting); zd. at  175 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). That 
is a New Ene, or separation of powers, argument. 
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the Court, therefore, have demonstrated that there are Erze con- 
cerns In this area, and that the debate concerning their resolution 
is still underway.82 The debate IS appropriate because, as the Court 
itself has recognized, "statutes of limitations represent a public 
policy decision about the privilege to litigate."83 
C. Preemptzon 
Despite the apparent command of Erze, federal courts fre- 
quently refuse to apply state law on the ground that the substan- 
tlve area 1s preempted by federal law.84 The courts' willingness to 
find preemption raises New Erze problems because of Congress' oc- 
casional practlce of malung preemption explicit.86 This rases the 
question whether, as with statutes of limitati0ns,8~ the absence of 
explicit congressional preemption signifies an Implicit rejection of 
it.87 Regardless whether the inference is accurate In any part~cular 
82. See, e.g., Reed v. United Tramp. Umon, 488 U.S. 319 (1989)(clauns under Labor- 
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 governed by state general or res~dual 
personal mjury statues of limitation); South Carolina v. Catawba Indian Tribe, Inc., 476 
U.S. 498 (1986)(under Catawba Indian Tribe Divls~on of Assets Act, state statutes of limita- 
tion apply). 
83. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Coons, 469 U.S. 1123,1126 (1985)(Rehnqulst, J., dissent- 
ing from denla1 of certiorari)(citing Chase Sec. Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304,314 (1945); 
G.D. Searle & Co. v. Cohn, 455 U.S. 404, 408 (1982)). 
One commentator writes, " '[Tlhe statutes embody an unportant policy of g.lmg repose 
to human &am.' The penods enacted are arbitrary ones. They represent what the Leg-~sla- 
ture deems to be a sufEc~ent penod m a particular h d  of case." D. SIEGEL, NEW YORK 
PRACTTCE 1 33, a t  34 (1978)(quoting Flanagan v. Mount Eden Gen. Hosp., 24 N.Y.2d 427, 
429,248 N.E.2d 871,872,301 N.Y.S.2d 23,25 (1969)); see also Tess~er v. United States, 269 
F.2d 305,310 (1st Ci. 1959)(acknowledg1ng policy of repose m statutes of limitation); Nolte 
v. Hudson Nav. Co., 297 F 758, 764 (2d Ci.)("[Statutes of limitation] are founded upon 
public policy."), cert. denzed, 264 U.S. 590 (1924). 
84. See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947). Accordmg to the 
Rice court: 
The scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive as to make reasonable the m- 
ference that Congress left no room for the States to supplement i t  [Tlhe object 
sought to be obtamed by the federal law and the character of the obligations Imposed 
by it  may reveal the same purpose. 
Id. a t  230. 
85. See, e.g., Employee Retirement Income Security Act, 29 U.S.C. 3 1144 (1988)(ex- 
plicitly preempting state regulation of ERISA covered employee benefit plans); Cigarette 
Labeling and Advertismg Act, 15 U.S.C. 3 1334 (1988)(explicitly preempting state law ciga- 
rette labeling requirements and other state law requmements "with respect to advert6mg or 
promotion of any c~garettes the packages of whch are labeled m conformity with the provl- 
sions of ths chapter"). 
86. See supra notes 79-83 and accompanymg text. 
87. Justice Brennan recently catalogued the three cucumstances m whch the federal 
courts would find preemption; explicit preemption, preemption by congress~onal occupation 
of the field and preemption by conflict between state and federal law: 
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case, the preemption issue involves substantial policy considera- 
tions. The New Erze doctrine asks, and potentially answers, the 
question of which branch of the federal government should make 
such policy judgments Congress. 
D. Established Areas of Federal Common Law 
The federal courts have created common law in many substan- 
tive areas, in addition to the procedural areas-abstention, stat- 
utes of limitations and preemption. Federal common law now ex- 
ists in, among others, admiralty, antitrust, labor law and what 
Professor Hill terms "proprietary intere~ts ."~~ The existence of t h s  
federal common law inevitably raises New Erre questions. 
The constitutional grant of federal court jurisdiction over ad- 
miralty casess9 has been regarded traditionally as justifying federal 
courts' creation of common law.90 Though the courts are empow- 
ered to create a federal common law of admiralty, much of the law 
they have created has no constitutional or statutory basis.91 But 
apart from tradition, what is the textual justification from a New 
Erre standpoint of the federal courts undertaking such an appar- 
In the absence of explicit statutory language signaling an mtent to pre-empt, we Infer 
such Intent where Congress has legwlated comprehenslvely to occupy an entire field 
of regulation, leavlng no room for the States to supplement federal law, or where 
the state law at lssue conflicts with federal law, either because it IS mpossible to 
comply with both, or because the state law stands as an obstacle to the accom- 
plishment and execution of congresslond objectives. 
Northwest Cent. Pipeline Corp. v. State Corp. Comm'n, 109 S. Ct. 1262, 1273 (1989)(citing 
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947)); see also Flonda Lme & Avocado 
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); H i e s  v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); L. TRIBE, 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-7, a t  481 11.14 (2d ed. 1988)(citing Pacific Gas & Elec. 
Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S. 190, 203-04 
(1983)(discussmg Supreme Court's three categories of preemption: express preemption, m- 
plied preemption and conflict preemption)). 
88. Hill, The Lawmakrng Power of the Federal Courts: Constitutional Preemption, 67 
COLUM. L. REV. 1024, 1025 (1967). 
89. See U.S. CONST. art. III, 8 2, cl. 1. 
90. See M. REDISH, supra note 76, a t  138-40; Hughes & Kelsey, Toxrc and Envrron- 
mental Torts Withm Admzralty, 62 TUL. L. REV. 405 (1988). Hughes and Kelsey assert that 
"[tlhe grant of admualty jurisdiction m article III section 2 of the Constitution has been 
construed btoncally as a constitutional acqmescence to pdiclal lawmalang." Id. at 418. 
91. See G. GUMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY 8 1-16, a t  45 (2d ed. 1975). 
G i o r e  and Black wrik. 
The Constitution extends the judicral power.to adrmralty cases, but 1s silent as 
to the substantive law to be applied to such cases. Federal statutes have set forth law 
that partially covers some mportant fields, but a vast amount of the maritime law 
applied today has no statutory or obwous constitutional warrant. 
Id. 
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ently legislative role? If separation of powers commands that the 
federal courts not be policy-makers, this enclave of judicial legisla- 
tion is difficult to justifye2 
In Textile Workers Unzon u. Lzncoln the Supreme 
Court Interpreted the jurisdictiond grant of the Labor Manage- 
ment Relations Acte4 as a command to create federal common law 
to regulate labor relations.e6 The command was anything but ex- 
plicit. Nonetheless, the federal courts have continued to fashion 
common law in this area, and have been lauded for doing so.9s The 
92. On the other hand, Congress' authority to legulate m admualty IS not clear either. 
Hart and Wechsler argue: 
Perhaps the most dramatic of [the assumptions of l a w - m h g  power by the federal 
courts on the bass of a juridictional grant] IS the power to create federal adrmralty 
law mplied by Article III's grant of adrmralty jmdiction-dramatic because the m- 
plication i the source not only of power to create judge-made law but also of Con- 
gress' power to legmlate on admualty matters. 
WT & WECHSLER, supm note 57, a t  883-84. Perhaps the explanation must be that the 
constitutional plan mplicitly adopted not only the common law of adrmralty that exleted m 
1787, but also the legitimacy of the courts to create such law. Because there i no reason to 
ditinguih courts' mvolvement m the law of admualty from them mvolvement m other sub- 
stantive areas, t h ~  explanation has important mplications for the role of federal courts 
generally as contemplated by the Framers. See znfra notes 211-32 and accompanying text 
(discussmg Framers' mtent). 
93. 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
94. 29 U.S.C. 3 185(a) (1988). 
95. Professor Redish has asserted that "section 301(a) of the Labor Management Rela- 
tions Act, as construed, vests unlimited authority m the hands of the federal judiciary 
to fashlon a common law of labor agreements. Such cases will look, smell, and taste like 
common law deciions, but may nevertheless be appropnately characterized as statutory 
mterpretation." Redish, supra note 64, a t  789. Professor Redish's distinction IS unsound. 
One may argue that statutory mterpretation IS analytically distinct from the creation of 
common law. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 57, a t  863; Westen & Lehman, Is There 
Life for Erle After the Death of Diversity?, 78 MICH. L. REV. 311, 332 (1980). To call the 
Court's actions m the labor-law field "interpretation," however, i to stretch the word be- 
yond all meanmg. In Lzncoln Milk, the court relied on a section of the Labor Management 
Relations Act that has no substantive content. Federal courts have mplied, not mferred, 
content m thls section based on theu perceptions of Congress' underlying policy. T ~ I S  pro- 
cess i legitimate and 1s a far cry from what ordinarily would be recognized as statutory 
mterpretation: extracting meanmg from statutes rather than inserting meanmg mto them. 
AB Professor Field asserts, "as long as the authommg enactment does not suggest the sub- 
stance of the rule, i t  IS properly considered a federal common law rule." Field, supra note 
17, a t  893 11.46. 
96. See, e.g., Friendly, supra note 17, a t  419 (footnote omitted). Judge Friendly 
commented: 
One of the beauties of the Lzncoln Milk doctnne for our day and age is that it per- 
mits overworked federal leg-islators, who must vote with one eye on the clock and the 
other on the next election, so easily to transfer a part of them load to federal judges, 
who have time for reflection and freedom from fear as to tenure and are ready, even 
eager, to resume them historic law-makmg function-with Congress always able to set 
matters right if they go too far off the desued beam. 
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potent~al for New Erze problems is clear. 
Federal court law-makmg also occurs on a broad scale in the 
antitrust area. "It is widely accepted today that the language of 
[sect~on 1 of the Sherman Act] was ~ntentionally drawn broadly, so 
that the judiciary could mold federal antitrust policy m ways it 
deemed adm~able."~~ Professors Merrill and Redish cons~der this a 
clear form of judicial lawmakmg delegated by Congress to the fed- 
eral Regardless how one character~zes it, the federal 
courts perform a cons~derable legislat~ve role m t h ~ s  area. For a 
New Erze purlst, t h ~ s  must be troublesome. 
Perhaps the oldest area of federal common law concerns "pro- 
pr~etary ~nterests."~~ The Supreme Court's decis~on m Clearfield 
Trust Co. v. Unzted Statesloo exemplifies t h ~ s  category. A govern- 
ment check was cashed on a forged endorsement. The United 
States, after substant~al delay m g~vlng notice of the forgery, 
sought to recover from Clearfield Trust, a guarantee~ng endorser. 
The issue was whether federal or state law would govern the effect 
of the government's delay m notification. The Court held that the 
government's rights and dut~es with respect to commerc~al paper 
that it had ~ssued should be governed by federal law and that Erze 
was inapplicable.lOl There being no federal statutory standard, the 
Court applied federal common law.lo2 
Clearfield often 1s mewed as the genesls of the "uniquely fed- 
eral interest" rationale for creat~ng federal common law. T h ~ s  ra- 
t~onale was described by the Court in Boyle v. U~zted Technolo- 
gzes Corporatzon.lo3 "[Wle have held that a few areas, mvolmng 
'uniquely federal mterests,' are so committed to federal con- 
trol that state law 1s pre-empted and replaced, where necessary, by 
Id. 
97. Redish, supra note 64, at 789 (citing Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 
1, 69-70 (1911)); see also 1 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST LAW IT 106, at 15 
(1978)(quoting Appalachan Coals v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 359-60 (1933))(The Sher- 
man Act was written with a "generality and adaptability comparable to that found to be 
desuable m constitutional provls~ons."). 
98. See Merrill, supra note 17, a t  44; Redish, supra note 64, at 789. Professor Merrill 
vlews Lzncoln Mills as establishmg the legitimacy of congress~onal delegation of law-makmg 
power to the judiciary m anti-trust cases. See Merrill, supra note 17, at 1025. 
99. Hi, supra note 88, at 1025. 
100. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The facts are taken from the Court's opmlon m Clearfield 
Trust, 318 U.S. a t  365-66. 
101. See zd. a t  366. 
102. See zd. at 367. The .Court "applied" rather than "created" federal common law 
because a federal common law rule had been developed before 1938 under the regme of 
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). See zd. 
103. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
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federal law of a content prescribed (absent explicit statutory direc- 
t~ve) by the courts-so-called 'federal common law.' "Io4 In Boyle, 
the Court used this rationale to justify creatmg a federal common 
law defense to a state wrongful death action.lo6 The survlvor of a 
serviceman killed m a helicopter crash sued the manufacturer of 
the helicopter. The Court, citing the " 'un~quely federal interests' " 
involved, created a defense for government contractors that nulli- 
fied the state cause of action.lo6 The majority commented at  length 
on the "Federal Government's mterest m the procurement of 
equ~prnent."'~~ The Court held that the " 'significant conflict' . 
between an identifiable 'federal policy or Interest and the [opera- 
tion] of state law"' compelled federal judicial displacement of 
state law.loS 
The majority failed to mention that on six occasions Congress 
had cons~dered and rejected similar protection for government 
contractors.10s Apparently, congress vlewed the federal policy con- 
cerns differently than did the Court. One can disagree with the 
Court's policy choices,IIO just as one can accept or reject the sepa- 
ration-of-powers premlse of the New Erze doctrine; but, irrespec- 
t ~ v e  of the policy decis~on, the approach by the Boyle majority un- 
deniably rmses the precise separation-of-powers concern at  which 
the New Erze doctrine IS directed. 
In the areas where the Court has created common law, the 
common thread IS the assertion of the peculiar need for federal 
104. Id. at  504 (quoting Texas Indus., Inc. v. RadclifT Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630,640 
(1981)); see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964)(creating federal 
"act of state" doctnne). 
105. See Boyle, 487 U.S. a t  512. 
106. See zd. at  504, 512-13. 
107. Id. at  506. 
108. Id. at  507 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Amencan Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 
(1966)). 
109. The Boyle dissent made note of Congress' actions. See rd. at  515-16 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting); see also rnfra text accompanying note 118 (Justice Brennan's language). 
110. Professor Redish cautions a g m t  permitting the extent of agreement with policy 
decisions to obscure the more fundamental mues: 
[Bloth scholars and jurrsts have criticized the efficacy and w d o m  of the various ab- 
stention doctrmes. But they have left largely untouched the important question of 
the federal judiciary's authority to ignore the dictates of valid jurisdictional and civil 
nghts statutes. 
[Nleither total nor partial judge-made abstention IS acceptable as a matter 
of legal process and separation of powera, wholly apart from the practical advlsabiity 
of either form of the doctrme. 
Redish, supra note 70, a t  71-74 (footnotes omitted). 
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common law, whether because of a "uniquely federal mterest" or 
because of a perception of strong federal policy in the area. As the 
next part of this Article demonstrates, however, the mdiwdual Jus- 
tices have been mconsistent m then approach to areas affecting 
New Erze concerns. 
Most recent members of the Court have acted inconsistently 
in the New Erze area, both in the reasoning of their own opinions 
and m then voting patterns.lll A curious phenomenon emerges 
when one studies their opmions: the Justices deal with the New 
Erze doctrine explicitly only when it supports the decision they de- 
sire; othermse, they ignore it. Justices Brennan, Powell, Scalia and 
Stevens exemplify how the Justices vacillate in their fidelity to and 
application of the separation-of-powers prmciple purportedly em- 
bodied in New Erze. This section briefly sets out how each of these 
Justices has taken both pro-and anti-New Erze positions. The jux- 
taposition of each Justice's inconsistent wews on the proper role of 
the federal courts and their entitlement to create common law 
reveals how diflicult the Justices find it rigorously to follow New 
Erze prmciples. 
A. Justzce Brennan 
1. Pro-New Erie 
Justice Brennan advocated New Erze principles in his dissent 
in Boyle v. Unzted Technologzes Corp.l12 In Boyle, the survivor of 
a serviceman killed in a helicopter crash sued the corporation who 
built the helicopter for the United States government.lls The court 
considered whether the defendants should have a "government 
contractors defense" amounting to immunity from private suit.ll4 
The majority created the defense as federal common law.l16 Justice 
I l l .  See supra notes 44-54 and accompanymg text (Justice Rehnqmt); znfra notes 
113-37 and accompanymg text (Justice Brennan); znfra notes 138-59 and accompanymg text 
(Justice Powell); znfra notes 160-76 and accompanymg text (Justice Scalia); rnfra notes 177- 
95 and accompanymg text (Justice Stevens); znfra note 196 and accompanymg text (Justices 
Rehnqmt, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor and White). Justices Kennedy and Souter are 
excepted, however, because they have not been on the Court long enough to be exposed to 
the vanety of New Ene problems. 
112. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
113. See zd. at 502. 
114. See zd. at 503-14. 
115. See zd. at 514; supra notes 104-11 and accompanymg text; znfra notes 175-77 and 
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Brennan, joined by Justice Blackmun, wgorously dissented, argu- 
ing that the Court's action vlolated separation-of-powers prmciples 
because the Court created a government contractor defense where 
Congress previously had refused to do so.l16 Justice Brennan ex- 
plicitly tied h s  disagreement with the majority's action to Erze.l17 
Indeed, he wewed Erze as implicated m two ways. First, Justice 
Brennan argued that Erze controlled as a matter of federalism, re- 
quirrng that state law not be displaced except " 'by the people 
through their elected representatives m Congress.' "'IS Second, he 
argued that judicid creation of a defense rejected by Congress of- 
fended separation of powers: " 'Whatever the merits of the policy' 
the Court mshes to mplement, 'its conversion into law is a proper 
subject for congressiond action, not for any creative power of 
ours.' . . We are judges, not, legislators, and the vote is not ours 
to cast."lle 
2. Antz-New Erie 
Most of Justice Brennan's writing is rnconsistent with the New 
Erze mew. In Reed v. United Transportatzon Unzon,120 for exam- 
accompanymg text. 
116. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan argued: 
If respondent's ~mmunity "bore the legitimacy of havlng been prescribed by the 
people's elected representatives," we would be duty bound to mplement theu will, 
whether or not we approved. Congress, however, has remamed s i len tand  consplcu- 
ously so, havmg resleted a sustcuned campagn by Government contractors to leplate 
for them some defense. The Court-unelected and unaccountable to the people-has 
unabashedly stepped mto the breach to legdate 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 481 U.S. 681,703 (1987)(Scalia, J., 
dissenting)). Justice Brennan catalogued Congress' rejection of the government contractors 
-unity defense and its rejection of an mdemnity for contractors' civil liabity. He found 
the followmg su instances of congressional r e f u d  to supersede contractors' liabity m- 
poaed by state law: 
HR 4765, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986)(limitations on c~vil iabity of Government 
contractors); S. 2441, 2378, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987)(indemnScation of clvil lia- 
b i t y  for Government contractors); H.R. 5883,98th Cong., 2d Sess. (1984)(same); H.EL 
1504, 97th Cong., 1st Sew. (1981)(same); H.EL 5351, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 
(1979)(same). 
Id. a t  515 n.1. 
117. See ad. a t  517-18. 
118. Id. a t  518 (quoting City of Milwaukee v. Illinole, 451 U.S. 304, 312-13 (1981)). 
119. Id. a t  530-31 (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 314-15 
(1947)). For opmons based on the New Ene doctrine that Justice Brennan jomed, see Uru- 
versity of Pennsylvam v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990) and Northwest Aulines, Inc. v. 
Transport Workers Uruon, 451 U.S. 77 (1981). See akio rnfra note 198 and accompanymg 
text (diicueemg Unruersity of Pennsylvanra); rnfra note 181 and accompanymg text (dig- 
cussmg Northwest Azrlines). 
120. 488 U.S. 319 (1989). 
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ple, Justice Brennan's majority oplnion created a federal limita- 
tions period for a union member's federal action against the union 
that alleged denial of free speech by borrowing a state limitations 
period.lZ1 Justice Brennan noted that the Court usually concludes 
from congressional silence that Congress intends courts to apply 
state limitations periods for federal clams, partly because of the 
Rules of Declsion Act,lZ2 and partly because of presumed congres- 
sional awareness that state law is used in such  circumstance^.^^^ 
Nonetheless, he recognized the federal courts' duty " 'to assure 
that the importation of state law will not frustrate or interfere with 
the implementation of national policies.' "Iz4 Justice Brennan later 
qualified this sweeping statement, however, by clsuming that where 
a state limitations period appears m conflict with federal policy, 
the assumption is that Congress would not want the state law to be 
used.lZ6 
In DelCostello v. Internattonal Brotherhood of T e a m ~ t e r s , ~ ~ ~  
Justice Brennan had explicitly rejected the argument that either 
Erte or the Rules of Decision Act compelled the use of state limita- 
tions per~ods for federal causes of action.lZ7 He wrote, "[Iln some 
circumstances state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfac- 
tory vehicles for the enforcement of federal law. In those mstances, 
it may be inappropriate to conclude that Congress would choose to 
adopt state rules at odds with the purpose or operation of federal 
substantive law."128 
121. See zd. a t  323. 
122. 28 U.S.C. 5 1652 (1988). 
123. See Reed, 480 U.S. a t  323-24. 
124. Id. (quoting Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 (1977)). 
125. See zd. The Reed Court's majority, of course, could have used the same 1og.1~ as 
that used m Boyle and found that the umqueness of the federal interest mvolved allows the 
creation of federal common law. See supra notes 104-11 and accompanymg text. Indeed, 
thu inconsistency IS the d i cu l ty  with the New Ene doctrme; polar views on either side go 
too far. 
126. 462 U.S. 151 (1983). 
127. See zd. a t  161 11.13. The DelCostello Court wrote, "[Nleither Ene nor the Rules 
of Declslon Act can now be taken as establishg a mandatory rule that we apply state law 
m federal mterstices." Id. 
128. Id. at 161. For New Ene purposes thw statement begs the question whether i t  IS 
the Court or the Congress that should make the judgment of when state rules are "at odds" 
with federal programs. One could argue, for example, that Congress IS familiar with the 
concept of limitations pen& and provides for them on occasion. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. 5 
160(b) (1988)(slx month limitation on clams of unfm labor practices to be filed with Na- 
tional Labor Relations Board); 42 U.S.C. 5 5412(b) (1988)(three-year limitation on actions 
for failure of home manufacturer to conform to federal standards); 47 U.S.C. $ 415(a) 
(1988)(two-year limitation on actions by common camers for recovery of charges). Under 
thw reasomg, Congress' failure to provide a limitation perlod for particular 1ee;lslation ls 
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Justice Brennan also favored the creation of federal common 
law in the area of implied rights of action.120 In Massachusetts 
Mutual Lzfe Insurance Co. v. Russell,lso a majority of the Court 
refused to imply a private right of action under the Employees Re- 
tlrement Income Security Actlsl on the ground that Congress had 
provlded its own remedial scheme.ls2 Although Justice Brennan 
concurred in the judgment, he separately wrote to emphasize his 
vlew that Congress intended federal courts to develop common law 
in fashonlng "appropriate equitable relief."ls3 Prior to Russell, 
Justice Brennan had written the Court's opinion in Cort v. Ash,ls4 
in which the Court refused to imply a private right of action 
though it specifically recognized the propriety of the procedure 
generally.ls6 Consistent with his general position in Cort, Justice 
Brennan joined the Courts' majorities in implylng private rights of 
action in Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smtth v. Curranls6 and 
Cannon v. Unzverszty of Chz~ag0.l~~ 
B. Justtce Powell 
1. Pro-New Erie 
Justice Powell's New Erze writings are volummous. He first ar- 
ticulated the doctrine in his dissent in Cannon v. Unzverszty of 
Chzcago;ls8 it marked the beginning of Justice Powell's effort to 
persuade the other Justices to accept a New Erte stance. In his 
either an mdication of mtent that there be none or that state law provlde the relevant mea- 
survlg penod. 
129. In Boyle v. United Technolog.les Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 515-31 (1988)(Brennan, J., 
dissenting), Justice Brennan sought to distinguish unplymg prlvate federal nghts of action 
from creating a federal defense to a state claun. He argued that only the latter displaced 
state law and thus rmed constitutional problems. See zd. at  517 n.2. The distinction 1s not 
supportable, however, for two reasons. First, unplymg a federal cause of action where no 
state claun exlsts may displace a state's decislon not to create a cause of action. Second, and 
more unportant, Justice Brennan's distinction deals only with the federalism concerns 
rased when federal courts create law. It is an old Ene mew. It does not address the New 
Ene separation of powers concerns that Justice Brennan hunself eloquently articulated m 
his Boyle dissent. 
130. 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
131. 29 U.S.C. $8 1001-1461 (1988). 
132. See Russell, 473 U.S. a t  147-48. 
133. Id. a t  149 (Brennan, J., concurnng)(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(3) (1988)). 
134. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). 
135. See zd. at 78. 
136. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). 
137. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
138. 441 U.S. 677, 730 (1979)(Powell, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 33-43 and 
accompmymg text (discussmg Justice Powell's Cannon dissent). 
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concurrence in Transamerzca Mortgage Advzsors, Inc. v. Lewzs,lSS 
Justice Powell noted that the Court's refusal to imply a private 
right of action in the absence of clear congressional intent was con- 
sistent with his Cannon dissent.140 
In Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smzth v. C~rran,'~' Jus- 
tice Powell dissented, argumg that the Court had violated the sep- 
aration of powers by implylng a private right of action under the 
Commodity Exchange The Curran majority found that 
Congress had intended a private right of action to exist because, in 
its 1974 amendments to the Act, Congress failed to overturn lower 
federal court decisions finding such a right.143 Justice Powell be- 
lieved this theory was "incompatible with our constitutional sepa- 
ration of He argued that lawmaking power in the judi- 
ciary cannot be justified on the theory that the legislature can 
always correct errors146 and concluded by reiterating his mew m 
Cannon that a private right of action only should be Implied when 
there is " 'compelling emdence that Congress in fact intended such 
an action to exist. 9 9,146 
Justice Powell has also articulated a New Erze position in the 
statutes-of-limitations area. In County of Onezda v. Onezda Indian 
N a t ~ o n , l ~ ~  the Oneida tribes brought an action agsunst two New 
139. 444 U.S. 11 (1979). 
140. See zd. at  25 (Powell, J., concunmg). 
141. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). 
142. See zd. at  395; 7 U.S.C. 38 1-26 (1988). 
143. See Curran, 456 U.S. a t  378-79. 
144. Id. at 395 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
145. See zd. at 408. Justice Powell wrote: 
Today's decls~on also IS disquieting because of its mplicit wew of the judic~al 
role m the creation of federal law. The Court propounds a test that taxes the lepla- 
tive branch with a duty to respond to opm~ons of the lower federal courts. The pen- 
alty for silence IS the rlsk of havlng those erroneous judicial opmlons mputed to 
Congress itself Despite the Court's allus~on to the lawmalung powers of courts 
at common law, t h ~ s  wew ls mconslstent with the theory and structure of our 
constitutional government. 
Id. (emphas~s added). 
146. Id. (quoting Cannon v. University of.Chcago, 441 U.S. 677,749 (1979)(Powell, J., 
dissenting)). One must wonder, of course, whether Justice Powell's reasolung becomes en- 
meshed m a dilemma of his own malung. His Cannon dissent essentially posed the problem 
of why, if congress~onal Intent to have a private nght of action wae so clear, the cause of 
action did not appear m the statute. Yet, one m~ght argue the clearer the mtent, the more 
significant the omlsslon from the statute and the stronger the mdication that somethmg 
overcame Congress' ong~nal mclination to have a prlvate r~ght of action. Thus, accepting 
Justice Powell's rationale, i t  may never be perrmssible to mply a private nght of action, 
despite the Justice's reservation of the theoretical possibility. 
147. 470 U.S. 226 (1985). 
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York counties to recover land conveyed to New York In 1795 in 
vlolat~on of a federal statute. The Tribes commenced the act~on in 
1970.148 The counties argued that the limitations per~od had run.149 
Just~ce Powell's majority opin~on held that although federal courts 
normally borrow state limitations per~ods, the hstory of congres- 
sional action with respect to Indian land clams demonstrated that 
Congress intended no limitat~ons period on such ~1rums . l~~  "It 
would be a violation of Congress' will were we to hold that a state 
statute of limitations period should be borrowed m these clrcum- 
stances."161 Follomng his New Erze principles, Just~ce Powell thus 
argued that legislative prlmacy connoted the impropr~ety of judi- 
cial lawmaking.162 
2. Antz-New Erie 
Just~ce Powell's approach to the legitimacy of judicial lawmak- 
mg was incons~stent, despite h ~ s  trong expressions of the policies 
that prohibit it. He regularly joined the Court's majority in di- 
recting Younger abstent10n.l~~ In Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, I r ~ c . , l ~ ~  
Just~ce Powell wrote the majority opinlon and substant~ally ex- 
panded the Younger d0~ t r i ne . l~~  Emphasizing h ~ s  concern for "a 
148. See zd. at  229. 
149. See zd. at  233. The counties argued that there was no pnvate nght of action. The 
Court disagreed and found that a common law nght of action existed whch antedated the 
Constitution. See zd. at  233-36. The Court also rejected defenses based on preemption, 
laches, abatement, ratification and nonjusticlability. See zd. at  233-50. 
150. See zd. at  240-41 (citing Occ~dental L i e  Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 367 
(1977); Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 465 (1975)). 
151. Id. at  244. 
152. Justice Powell also adopted new Erze positions m Massachusetts Mutual L i e  Ins. 
Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985)Gomed majority opmon denylng Implied right of action 
under ERISA) and Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)(Powell, J., 
concumng)(concurred m judgment denylng pnvate rlght of action for compensatory relief 
under Title VI of Civil Rights Act of 1964). 
153. See, e.g., Oho Civil Rights Comm'n v. Dayton C h t i a n  Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 
619 (1986)(where state proceeding IS pending, federal court should a b s h  from declding 
first amendment defense m sex discmiation action); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 
(1979)(in pending state child abuse action federal court should a b s h  from declding 
habeus corpus action); Tramor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977)(m state attachment of 
property action, federal court should a b s h  from declding due process defense); Hicks v. 
Miranda, 422 U.S. 332 (1975)(in pending state cnrmnal proceeding federal court should ab- 
stam from heamg federal cnrmnal action); HufFman v. Pursue, LM., 420 U.S. 592 (1975)(m 
pendiig state nmance action federal court should abstam from decldiig h t  amendment 
violation). 
154. 481 U.S. 1 (1987). 
155. Before Pennzoil, the Younger doctrme had not been applied to wholly pnvate 
clvil litigation; all preceding Younger cases had mvolved the state or its officers. 
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proper respect for state functions,"16e Justice Powell asserted that 
Younger abstention is appropriate "not only when the pending 
state proceedings are criminal, but also when certcun civil proceed- 
ings are pending, if the State's interests In the proceeding are so 
important that exercise of the federal judicial power would disre- 
gard the comity between the States and the National Govern- 
ment."16? Thus, Justice Powell led the Court in an evaluation of 
when federal judicial power should extend to cases that touch state 
mte res t~ . l~~  Apparently, Justice Powell did not see the New Erze 
problems presented by the fact that Congress, presumably also 
concerned about the relationship between state and federal govern- 
ments, expressly granted jurisdiction that entitled Texaco to seek 
relief in the federal courts.169 Under Justice Powell's leadership m 
Pennzoil, the Court effectively substituted its policy judgment for 
that of Congress' regarding the proper scope of federal jurisdiction. 
C. Justzce Scalia 
1. Pro-New Erie 
Justice Scalia has been a strong supporter of Justice Powell's 
vlsion of the limited role of the federal courts. With respect to im- 
plied rights of action, Justice Scalia's concurrence in Thompson v. 
Thompson1s0 quoted Justice P.owellYs Cannon dissent and urged 
that the federal courts "get out of the buslness of implied private 
rights of action altogether."lsl In the statutes-of-limitations area, 
Justice Scalia has argued that the Constitution, as interpreted in 
Erze, requires federal courts to apply state law unless Congress has 
affirmatively displaced it. For example, m Agency Holding Corp. v. 
Malley-Duff & Assoczates, Inc.,ls2 Justice Scalia argued that the 
federal courts lacked the power to create a limitations period and, 
therefore, if the applicable state limitations period was inconsis- 
tent with federal policy, there could be no limitation on the federal 
156. Pennzoil, 481 U.S. at 10 (quoting Younger v. Hams, 401 U.S. 37'44 (1971)). 
157. Id. at 11. 
158. The Irony of the Pennzoil majority's position IS that "[tlhe State of Texas-not a 
party m ttus appeal--expressly represented to the Court of Appeals that it 'has no Interest 
m the [underlymg action,]' except m fau adjudication." Id. at 19 (Brennan, J., concur- 
nng)(quoting Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 784 F.2d 1133, 1150 (2d Cu. 1986), rev'd, 481 
U.S. 1 (1987)). 
159. See 28 U.S.C. 5s 1331, 1343 (1988). 
160. 484 U.S. 174 (1988). 
161. Id. at 192 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
162. 483 U.S. 143 (1987). 
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claun.les In Stewart Organzzatton, Inc. v. Rzcoh Corp.,le4 Justlce 
Scalia dissented from the Court's holding that the validity of a fo- 
rum-selection clause in an antitrust case is governed by federal 
law. He argued that "[iln general, while interpreting and applylng 
substantive law IS the essence of the 'judicial Power' created under 
Article I11 of the Constitution, that power does not encompass the 
malung of substantive law.:le5 
2. Ank-New Erie 
Justice Scalia has not, however, adhered consistently to h ~ s  
strong pronouncements about the limited lawmaking power of fed- 
eral courts; h s  IS a jurisprudence at  war with itself. In Pennsylva- 
nza v. Unzon Gas Co.,lee he adopted a broader mew of the judicial 
role. At Issue was whether two federal enmronmental statutes au- 
thorued private actions against states.le7 Justlce Scalia concurred 
with the majority that the statutes permitted prlvate a c t ~ o n s . ~ ~ ~  In 
163. See ad. a t  161-64 (Scalia, J., concurring). In Malley-Duff, Justice Scalia wrote: 
First, state statutes of limitations whose terms appear to cover federal statutory 
causes of action apply as a matter of state law to such clams, even though the state 
legdature that enacted the statutes did not have those clams m mmd. Second, Impo- 
sition of limitations perlods on federal causes of action u w i t h  the States' powers, if 
not pre-empted by Congress. W d ,  the obligation to apply state statutes of limita- 
tions does not spmg from Congress' Intent m enacting the federal statute; rather, 
that mtent u relevant only to the question whether the state limitations perlod has 
been pre-empted by Congress' failure to provlde one. Fourth, congressional silence on 
the limitations usue u ordinarily msufficlent to pre-empt state statutes; "speclal pro- 
vlslon" by Congress u reqwed to do that. Fifth, the federal statute-its substantive 
provlslons rather than ita mere silence-may be sufficient to pre-empt a state statute 
that diicrmmates agamt federal nghta or m too short to permit the federal nght to 
be vmdicated. 
We need not embark on a quest for an "appropnate" statute of limitations 
except to the limited extent that m a h g  those deternations may entail judgments 
as to whlch statute the State would believe "appropnate" and as to whether federal 
policy nevertheless makes that statute "inappropnate." Finally, if we d e t e r n e  that 
the state limitations penod that would apply under state law u pre-empted because i t  
i mconslstent with the federal statute, that u the end of the matter, and there m no 
limitation on the federal cause of action. 
Id. (citations omitted). Accord Reed v. United Transp. Unlon, 109 S. Ct. 621, 630 
(1989)(Scalia, J., concurnng)("[T]he Court should apply the appropnate state statute 
when a federal statute lacks an explicit limitations penod."). 
164. 487 U.S. 22 (1988). 
165. Id. a t  38 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
166. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
167. See zd. at 5. 
168. See zd. a t  29 (Scalia, J., concumng m part, dissenting m part). Justice Scalia, 
however, believed that the authorization was unconstitutional under the eleventh amend- 
ment. See zd. a t  35-42. 
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the course of his opinion, Justice Scalia elaborated on his mew of 
the judicial role in interpreting statutes.16e Referring to the ex- 
haustive analyses of congressional intent by Justices Brennan and 
White, Justice Scalia observed: 
That methodology is appropriate if one assumes that the 
task of a court of law 1s to plumb the mtent of the particular Con- 
gress that enacted a particular provlslon. That methodology is not 
mme nor, I t h k ,  the one that courts have traditionally followed. It 
is our task, not to enter the minds of the Members of Congress, 
but rather to Sve f a r  and reasonable meanlng to the text of the 
United States Code, adopted by various Congresses at var~ous 
tirnes.170 
Thus, Justice Scalia would empower courts with considerable dis- 
cretion to decide cases based on the overall statutory structure 
rather than strictly on the specific intent of Congress. Ironically, 
the majority in Cannon employed Justice Scalia's approach to im- 
ply a private right of action for gender discrimination under Title 
IX of the Education Amendments of 1972.171 
Justice Scalia engaged in significant judicial legislation m 
Boyle v. Unzted Technologzes C ~ r p . l ? ~  In that case, Justice Scalia 
created a federal government-contractor's defense to a state cause 
of action for wrongful death.17s Writing for the majority, Justice 
Scalia determined that the Court should create law where " 'signif- 
icant conflict' exists between an identifiable 'federal policy or in- 
terest and the [operation] of state law,' . or [where] the applica- 
tion of state law would 'frustrate specific objectives' of federal 
legislation.' He considered protection of federal policy interests 
to be an appropriate judicial function, not one exclusively for the 
1egi~lature.l~~ Justice Scalia's position m Boyle is particularly note- 
worthy because Congress had considered the defense before the 
Court on six different occasions and had decided not to enact it.176 
169. See zd. at 24-30. 
170. Id. at 35. 
171. See Cannon v. University of Chlcago, 441 U.S. 677, 693-94 (1979). Title M pro- 
hibits gender-based discrunmation m education programs recelvlng federal h a n c ~ a l  awls- 
tance. See 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-88 (1988). 
172. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). See supra notes 104-07 and accompanymg text (facts of 
Boyle). 
173. See zd. at  512. 
174. Id. at  507 (quoting Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 68 (1966); 
United States v. K i b e l l  Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715,728 (1979)). 
175. See zd. at  504. 
176. See zd. at  515-16 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see also supra note 118 and accompa- 
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D. Justzce Stevens 
1. Pro-New Erie 
On several occasions, Justice Stevens has taken New Erze po- 
sitions. In Massachusetts Mutual Lzfe Insurance co. v. Russell,177 
he wrote for the Court and refused to imply a private right of ac- 
tion under ERISA.178 "'The federal judiciary will not engraft a 
remedy on a statute, no matter how salutary, that Congress did not 
intend to p ro~ lde . " ' ~~~  For Justice Stevens, congressional Intent 
was the touchstone for unplymg a private right of action.lsO Justice 
Stevens' position makes implication at  least unlikely, and it is 
based on New Erze separation of powers doctrine.lsl 
In Boyle v. Unzted Technologzes Corp.,lS2 Justice Stevens dis- 
sented, on New Erze grounds, from the Court's creation of a gov- 
ernment-contractors unmunity defense: 
When judges are asked to embark on a lawmalung venture, I 
nymg text (Justice Brennan's disscussion of Congress' failure to enact a federal contractor's 
defense). 
177. 473 U.S. 134 (1985). 
178. Pub. L. No. 93-406,88 Stat. 829 (1974)(codified as amended m scattered sections 
of 29 U.S.C.). 
179. Russell, 437 U.S. a t  145 (quoting Califomla v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 297 
(1981)). 
180. Justice Powell left a small exception to  IS "no mplication" rule, recogmizing that 
if there IS persuasive ewdence of specific congress~onal mtent that a pnvate nght of action 
exlets, then the federal courts may properly mply one. See supra notes 43,146 and accom- 
panymg text. 
Prewously, Justice Stevens had adopted the same exception as had Justice Powell. In 
Northwest Anlines Inc. v. Transport Workers U~llon, 451 U.S. 77 (1981), writing for the 
majority, Justice Stevens declined to mply a pnvate nght of action for contribution, al- 
though he recogwed that such an implication would be permtssible if Congress' Intent to 
have such a remedy could fwly be mferred. See zd. a t  90. 
181. Justice Stevens occasionally forgets  IS reliance on congress~onal mtent. In Cali- 
fomla v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981), he concurred m the Court's refusal to lmply a 
prlvate nght of action even though he specifically found the reqwite congress~onal mtent. 
Justice Stevens wrote: 
At the time the statute was enacted, I believe the lawyers m Congress slmply as- 
sumed that prlvate parties would have a remedy for any qury suffered by rea- 
son of a wolation of the new federal statute. For a t  that time the mplication of pn- 
vate causes of action was a well-known practice a t  common law and m Amencan 
courts. Therefore, m my vlew, the Members of Congress merely assumed that the 
federal courts would follow the anclent maxlm "ubz IW, ibz remedium" and mply a 
pnvate rlght of action. Accordingly, if I were writing on a clean slate, I would hold 
that an mplied remedy IS available to respondents under thu statute. 
Id. a t  299-300 (Stevens, J., concumng)(citation omitted). Justice Stevens found that analy- 
sls under the rubr~c of Cort v. Ash led to the opposite result and, moreover, fidelity to the 
analytical method was more nuportant than fidelity to congress~onal mtent. See zd. a t  301. 
182. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). 
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believe they should carefully consider whether they, or a legmlative 
body, are better equipped to perform the task at hand. There are 
instances of so-called interstitial lawmaking that mevitably become 
part of the judicial process. But when we are asked to create an en- 
tirely new doctrine-to answer "questions of policy on whch Con- 
gress has not spoken," we have a special duty to identify the 
proper decisionmaker before trylng to make the proper decision. 
When the novel question of policy involves a balancing of the 
conflictmg mterests in the efficient operation of a massive govern- 
mental program and the protection of the rights of the individual 
I feel very deeply that we should defer to the expertise of the 
C~ngress.'~~ 
Like Justice Brennan, Justice Stevens found that the New Erte 
doctrine prohibits the federal judicial lawmakmg exemplified by 
Boyle.ls4 
2. Antt-New Erie 
Justice Stevens also has been inconsistent in his New Erte 
views. In Brtscoe v. LaHue,lS6 plantiff sought damages under 42 
U.S.C. section 1983 against a police officer for gvmg perjured testl- 
mony at  the defendant's criminal trial. Justice Stevens refused to 
carve out an exception to the common-law immunity of witnesses 
from civil suit.lss Significantly, however, he rejected the exception 
not on separation-of-powers grounds, but because it would be bad 
policy.ls7 Thus, the Court unabashedly made a policy decision, im- 
plicitly asserting the propriety of doing so. 
Despite his pro-New Erte opinions,lss Justice Stevens occa- 
sionally favors broader powers of implication than the Court's pri- 
mary New Erte theorists, Justice Powell and Chief Justice Rehn- 
quist, are willing to countenance. In Guardians Assoctatzon v. Civil 
Servtce Cornrntss~on,~~~ Justice Stevens dissented from the major- 
183. Id. at 531-32 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. G i a n ,  347 U.S. 
507, 511 (1954)). Justice Stevens mcluded another s~gnificant reference to Gilman: " 'The 
selection of that policy whch IS most advantageous to the whole mvolves a host of consider- 
ations that must be weighed and apprtused. That function IS more appropnately for those 
who write the law, rather than for those who mterpret them.' " Id. at  532 (quoting G i ,  
347 U.S. a t  511-13). 
184. See supra notes 104-07 and accomprnng text (discussmg Boyle). 
185. 460 U.S. 325 (1983). 
186. See ad. at 336-41. 
187. See ad. at 341-42. 
188. See supra notes 177-84 and accompanymg text. 
189. 463 U.S. 582 (1983). 
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ity's denial of a private right of action under Title VI, finding 
enough evldence of congressional intent to support the action.lS0 
Similarly, he wrote the majority opinion m Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran,lel implylng a private right of ac- 
tion under the Commodity Exchange ActlS2 in the face of a vigor- 
ous dissent by Justice Indeed, Justice Stevens disputed 
Just~ce Powell's thesis directly, arguing that separation of powers 
does not counsel aganst judicial implication of private rights of 
action: 
"Courts are organs with hs tor~c  antecedents whch bring with 
them well-defined powers. They do not requne explicit statutory au- 
thorization for familiar remedies to enforce statutory obligations. A 
duty declared by Congress does not evaporate for want of a formu- 
lated sanction. When Congress has 'left the matter a t  large for judi- 
cial determmation,' our function is to decide what remedies are ap- 
propriate m the light of the statutory language and purpose and of 
the traditional modes by whlch courts compel performance of legal 
~bl igat ions."~~~ 
Justice Stevens' opinion in Merrill Lynch demonstrates that the 
Court's recent restriction on implylng private rights of action is a 
policy decision rather than a constitutional compulsion under the 
separation-of-powers doctrine. Finally, Justice Stevens wrote the 
majority opinion in Cannon, the case that prompted Justice Pow- 
ell's first exposition of the New Erze doctrine.le6 
E. The New Erie Prznczple: Now You See It; 
Now You Don't 
As the foregoing survey demonstrates, Justices Brennan, Pow- 
190. See zd. at 639-42 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
191. 456 U.S. 353 (1982). 
192. 7 U.S.C. 11 1-26 (1988). 
193. See Curran, 456 U.S. at 395-409 (Powell, J., dissenting); see also supra notes 143- 
46 and accompanymg text (discussmg Curran). 
194. Merrill Lynch, 456 U.S. a t  376 (citations ornitted)(quoting Montana-Dakota Co. 
v. Northwestern Pub. Sew. Co., 341 U.S. 246, 261-62 (1951)(Frankfurter, J., dissenting)). 
Justice Stevens also took msue with Justice Powell's hands-off approach m County of 
OneIda v. OneIda Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226 (1985). In Onezda, Justice Powell, writing for 
the Court, dec~ded that Congress' failure to provlde a limitations per~od precluded the 
Court from creating one. See zd. a t  244; see also supra notes 147-52 and accompanymg text 
(discussmg Onezda). Justice Stevens, jomed by Chef Justice Burger and Justices White and 
Rehnqulst, argued that the Court should have created a federal limitations per~od. See 
Onerda, 470 U.S. a t  256-62 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
195. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanymg text (discussmg Justice Powell's New 
Erze doctrme m Cannon). 
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ell, Scalia and Stevens have not adhered consistently to the New 
Erze doctrine. Other members of the Court, Chief Justice Rehn- 
qmst and Justices Blackmun, Marshall, O'Connor and White, have 
been equally selective in adhering to New Erze principles.le6 The 
196. A renew of the statements made by the remmmg members of the Court demon- 
strates that they do not apply or reject the New Ene theory with any greater consitency 
than Justices Brennan, Powell, Scalia and Stevens. For example, m Umversity of Pennsylva- 
ma v. EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990), Justice Blackmun stated: "We are especially reluctant to 
recogme a privilege m an area where i t  appears that Congress has considered the relevant 
competing concerns but has not provided the privilege itself The balancmg of conflict- 
mg Interests of thls type IS particularly a le~slative function." Id. at 582. In Miitretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 301 (1989), however, Justice Blackmun wrote that "the Framers did 
not requue-and mdeed rejected-the notion that the three Branches must be entirely sep- 
arate and distinct." Id. at 380. 
In City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981), Justice Rehnqut  wrote: "Federal 
courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a general 
power to develop and apply thev own rules of deciion." Id. at  312. In Miree v. DeKalb 
County, 433 U.S. 25 (1977), however, Justice Rehnqwt recogwed that the exletence of a 
significant federal mterest permits federal courts to make common law. See zd. at 31. 
Although Justice Marshall has not written an opmion based on New Ene prmc~ples, he 
jomed Justice Brennan's strong dissent m Boyle v. United Technolo@es Corp., 487 U.S. 500 
(1988), that argued the New Ene vlew of skparation of powers. See td. at 515 (Brennan, J., 
dissenting). He has expressed support, however, for creating federal common law. See 
Guardians Ass7n v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983)(Marshall J., dissenting). In 
Guardians, Justice Marshall noted that where overall legdative purpose IS clear, federal 
courts should fashlon appropriate remedies "though they rest on mferences. Otherwise we 
mpute to Congress a futility mconsitent with the great design of the legulation." Id. at  625 
(quoting United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482,492 (1960)). Moreover, Justice 
Marshall jomed opuuons favormg mplication of private nghta of action on a broader basi 
than that endorsed by the Court's New Ene supporters. See, e.g., Merrill Lynch, Pierce, 
Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982)(jommg majority m mplylng pnvate 
right of action); Transamenca Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lem,  444 U.S. 11 (1979)(jommg 
Justice White's dissent from the majority's refusal to mply a pnvate rlght of action); Can- 
non v. Umversity of Chlcago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979)(jommg mqority m mplymg a prlvate 
r~ght of action). 
Similarly, Justice O'Connor has not written m the New Ene vem, but has jomed major- 
ity oplnlons relymg m whole or m part on the doctrine. In Umversity of Pennsylvania v. 
EEOC, 110 S. Ct. 577 (1990), Justice O'Connor jomed the Court's unanmous refusal to 
extend a common-law qualified disclosure privilege. See zd. at  582. Also, m Massachusetts 
Mutual L i e  Ins. Co. v. Russell, 473 U.S. 134 (1985), Justice O'Connor jomed Justice Ste- 
vens' mqority opmion refuslng to mply a private cause of action under ERISA for contrac- 
tual damages. See zd. at 148. Conversely, Justice O'Connor led the Court m malung policy 
judgments that ignore state law m favor of federal common law m Agency Holdimg Corp. v. 
Malley-Duff & Aasocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987). Justice O'Connor wrote: "In some limited 
cucurnstances, however, our characterization of a federal clam has led the Court to con- 
clude that 'state statutes of limitations can be unsatisfactory vehlcles for the enforcement of 
federal law.' " Id. at 147 (quoting DelCostello v. International Bd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 
151, 161 (1983)). 
Justice White endorsed new Ene pmciples m Malley v. Bnggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986), 
writing: "We reemphasue that our role is to mterpret the mtent of Congress m enacting 
8 1983, not to make a freewheeling policy choice, and that we are gulded in interpreting 
Congress' intent by the common-law tradition." Id. at  342. In Guardians Ass'n v. Civil Sem. 
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Idea that the federal courts lack the power to create common law 
has been used as a tool of convenrence by both the liberal and con- 
servative members of the Court. Although the proponents of the 
New Erze doctrine support it with the Idea that the courts should 
not partlclpate in makmg federal policy, they do not shrmk from 
making federal policy m some areas. Specifically, the Court has 
made law based on policles of the federal government's need to 
protect those with whom it does buslness and of the need for fed- 
eral-court deference to state courts. The Court has done so even 
when there is persuaslve evidence that the "proper" policy-making 
branches of the federal government have already considered the 
matter.le7 At the same tlrne, those Justlces who generally do not 
subscribe to the New Erze doctrme in its full scope nonetheless 
turn to it in times of need. 
Whether neutral princlplesles can ever be achieved IS questlbn- 
able, but it is difficult to quibble with then desirability When doc- 
trines like New Erze are used as justifications for reaching desired 
results in particular cases, rather than as tools of prmclpled analy- 
sis, both the law and the Court suffer. Each Justlce needs to de- 
velop a consistent wslon of the New Erze doctrine. Although the 
Justlces collectively may not agree on what that vlslon should be, 
they should at  least, from case to case, be consistent in their own 
vlews. Part V suggests one possible wsion. 
V How BROAD IS THE NEW Erze DOCTRINE? 
A. Does the New Erle Flow from Erie? 
One of the ironles of the New Erze doctrme IS that Erze Rail- 
Comm'n, 463 U.S. 582 (1983), Justice White wrote the Court's oplluon refuemg to Imply of a 
private right of action because Congress had not specifically mtended one to exlst. See ad. at  
597. Justice White, however, has been an active participant m the extension of the Court- 
made Younger abstention doctnne. See Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 348-50 (1975). 
Former Chef Justice Burger was equally mconsitent m hls approach to the new Ene 
doctrme. In Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630 (1981), he stated 
that "regardless of the merits of the conflicting arguments, [a federal common law pnvate 
right to contribution] IS a matter for Congress, not the courts, to resolve." Id. at  646. In 
United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580 (1973), however, he wrote: 
"There will often be no specific federal lewlation govemmg a particular transaction to 
whch the United States i a party But silence on that score m federal lepslation IS no 
reason for limiting the reach of federal law." Id. at 593. 
197. See, e.g., Boyle v. United Technolopes Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988). Boyle 1s dii- 
cussed supra notes 103-10 and accompanymg text; see ako supra notes 66-78 and accompa- 
nymg text (discussmg jurisdiction and abstention). 
198. See generally Wechsler, supra note 12 (discussmg neutral prmciples theory). 
Heinonline - -  1990 Utah L. Rev. 795 1990 
796 UTAH LAW REVIEW [1990: 759 
road v. T o r n p k ~ n s ~ ~ ~  promdes so little support for it. Erte was not a 
separation of powers case. Justice Brandeis asserted that there was 
no federal competence, either congressional or judicial, to develop 
substantive law that provlded a standard for adjudicating the 
case.200 One might quarrel with that conclusion as a matter of sub- 
stantive law.201 Indeed, commentators argue that even in Erte's 
tune, "Congress would have been seen as hamng power to prescribe 
a substantive rule of liability for the specific accident in Erte."*02 
The divergence between what the commentators hypothesized and 
what the Erte Court s a d  1s significant for New Erte purposes. 
First, if the Erte Court had taken the position that Congress 
could have prescribed a substantrve rule covering the liability of 
common carriers, then the Court's insistence that there was no ju- 
dicial power to formulate such a rule would have had enormous 
separation-of-power implications. The case then would have 
presented a clear situation of legislative competence without cor- 
relative judicial competence. If the judiciary had sought to pre- 
scribe such a rule, arguably it would have usurped the prerogatives 
of the legislature and thus violated separation-of-powers 
principles. 
The Court, however, did not recognize congressional compe- 
199. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
200. See zd. a t  78-79. 
201. In the year before Ene, the Court appeared to broaden substantially the reach of 
the commerce clause. In NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), the 
Court extended the clause to reach activities that were previously seen as local and thus 
beyond the scope of mterstate commerce. The Court stated, "Although activities may be 
mtrastate m character when'separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial 
relation to mterstate commerce that them control IS essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exerclse 
that control." Id. a t  37. 
Control of the liability of mterstate camers may not be "essential" to protect ~nterstate 
commerce, but it is appropnate. Years earlier, the Court foreshadowed that position. See 
Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 38 (1916)(Federal leplation under the commerce 
clause applies to "all cars used on any railway that IS a hghway of mterstate commerce, 
whether the particular cars are a t  the time employed m such commerce or not."). 
202. Mishlun, supra note 17, a t  1684 n.lO. Professor Ely has reached the same conclu- 
sion: "Congressional legslation based upon the commerce clause c e M y  could have cov- 
ered the specific question at  Issue m Ene." See Ely, supra note 17, at 703 11.62. Professor 
Field agrees: 
[Allthough the [Ene] Court talks about courts makmg "rules of declslon whlch Con- 
gress was confessedly without power to enact as statutes," it is hard to believe that 
the substantive rule a t  lssue m Erze was beyond congressional competence. Surely 
Congress has power to regulate Interstate railroads' liabiity to trespassers, if it wshes 
to do so. 
Field, supra note 17, at 926 (emphasis m origmal). 
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tence-it did just the opposite. Justice Brandeis assumed that 
there was no federal legislative competence in the substantive 
area.=Os He wrote: "Congress has no power to declare substantive 
rules of common law applicable in a State."204 This statement 
would not have been mere dictum, but severely misleading dictum 
had the Court Intended to craft an argument based on separation 
of powers. That the Court did not so intend is perhaps made clear- 
est by the concluding sentence of Justice Brandeis' constitutional 
discussion: "We declare that in applying the doctrine [of Swzft 
v. Tyson] this Court and the lower courts have invaded rights 
whch m our opinion are reserved by the Constitution to the sev- 
eral States."206 The rights the Court identified as having been in- 
vaded were not within the prerogatives of Congress, but rather be- 
longed to the states. As Judge Friendly observed, "A court's stated 
and, on its view, necessary basis for deciding does not become dic- 
tum because a critic would have decided on another basis."206 He 
concluded that "the lack of law-making power by Congress was a 
principal underpinning to the conclusion of Erze as to the want of 
such power by federal judges."207 Erze Railroad v. Tompkzns, 
therefore, does not support the New Erze doctrine.208 
B. Does the New Erie Derzve from the Framers and the 
Constztutzon? 
It is quite dficult to find direct textual justification in the 
Constitution for the New Erze doctrine. Professor Pierce observes: 
If the Framers decided to ~ncorporate a requirement of separation of 
powers m the Constitution, that decision was mplicit rather than 
explicit. Articles I, 11, and 111 establish three branches of govern- 
ment, but they say little about the powers of each. There is no defi- 
203. See Ene, 304 U.S. at 78-80. 
204. Id. at 78. 
205. Id. at  80. 
206. Friendly, supra note 17, at 385-86 (footnote omitted). 
207. Id. at  404. 
208. Accordingly, the term "New Ene" ~s a mnomer. -Nonetheless, i t  ~s a nusnomer 
that has some staymg power. 
Professor Field argues that "Ene ~s amblguous as to whether courts can make rules as 
broadly as Congress or whether the Constitution mcapacitates courts even m areas w i th  
congressional competence." Field, supra note 17, at 927. She bases that assertion on a per- 
ception that the commerce power would have extended to the facts of Ene. See supra note 
202 and accompanymg text. While t h  perception may be accurate, i t  does not make the 
case amblguous. Because the Court did not vlew the commerce power m that way, the ambi- 
guity le avoided. See supra notes 203-07 and accompanymg text. 
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nition of "executive" or "legislative" powers, and the only definition 
of "judicial" power is ambiguous and negative; judicial power ex- 
tends only to the resolution of cases or controversies. Consp~cuously 
absent from the text of the Constitution is any language requiring 
separation of 
The Constitution's implications for separation of powers come 
from the introductory language of the first three articles.21° Profes- 
sor Downs accepts that language on its face, arguing that 
"[n]oth~ng in the Constitution remotely suggests that judges shall 
participate in [the] law-makmg process."211 Thus, he clams that 
any judicial lawmakmg violates the separation of powers.212 
The constitutional language, however, begs the question of 
what the Framers understood and intended by the terms "legisla- 
tive power" and "judicial power."213 One author has noted that 
"neither the Constitution nor the statutes relevant to judicial pow- 
ers answer any of the important questions [dealing with the extent 
209. Pierce, Morrlson v. Olson, Separation of Powers, and the Structure of Govern- 
ment, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 1, 7. Professor Pierce pomts out that Justice Scalia finds support 
for h e  vlslon of the separation doctrme m the separation-of-powers language of the Massa- 
chusetts Constitution of 1780. See zd. at 7. Pierce correctly argues, however, that Justice 
Scalia's evldence cuts the wrong way "[s]ince the Framers h c e  rejected language wtually 
identical to that conttuned m the Massachusetts provlslon." Id. Professor Beermann also 
agrees: "The federal Constitution, unlike many state constitutions, has no separation of 
powers clause that mght take on mdependent doctrmal meanmg." See Beermann, supra 
note 14, at 1058 11.20. 
210. Article I states m part: "All legdative Powers herem granted shall be vested m a 
Congress." U.S. CONST. art. I, 3 1. Article I1 states m part. "The executive Power shall be 
vested in a President." U.S. CONST. art. 11, 3 1, cl. 1. Finally, Article ID states m park "The 
judicd Power of the United States, shall be vested m one supreme Court, and m such 
mfenor Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordam and establish." U.S. CONST. 
art. In, 3 1, cl. 1. 
211. Downs, Judges, Law-makzng and the Constitutiorx A Response to Professor 
White, 63 JUDICATURE 444, 450 (1980). Professor Downs urges that democratic theory com- 
pels t h s  result, because to allow the judiclary to legmiate commits that,function to an un- 
representative branch. See zd. at 451-52; see also R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 4 
(1990)("There IS no famtest hmt m the Constitution that the judiclary shares any of 
the legdative or executive power."). One can, of course, agree with those sentiments m the 
abstract without necessarily agreemg on what constitutes leeslation and what constitutes 
judicial mterpretation and enforcement of legdative policy. 
212. Downs, supra no t .  211 at  450. 
213. Professor Beerman rmed t h  question m criticlzmg the positions that Professor 
Rediih and the author took on the Court's refusal to accept some junsdictiond grants 
"[Nleither paper makes a serious attempt to present an unage of the judicld and legdative 
powers!' Beerman, supra note 14, a t  1060. T ~ I S  criticism i well taken. The author here 
attempts to present an mage of judiclal power. The author does not, however, retreat from 
the substantive arguments made m h prior article that the Court has vlolated separation of 
powers by directly refusmg to implement congress~ond grants of jurisdiction. See 
Doernberg, supra note 71. 
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of the federal courts' lawmaking power]."214 Professor Eskrldge IS 
more emphatic: "Nowhere does the Constitution say that Congress 
shall have all lawmaking power The commonly accepted 
meanlng of 'legislative Powers'-m 1789 as well as today-IS the 
power to enact statutes, which can overrlde the common law that 
is part of the ‘judicial Power."'216 Even Professor Brown, a 
staunch advocate of the New Erze doctrme, acknowledges that the 
Constitution's text provldes no answer and that the orlglnal under- 
standing of the grant of judicld power was broader than the New 
Erze doctrine will allow.21s Professor Brown wrote, "[Ilt seems rea- 
sonable to assume that the Framers had m mmd those courts with 
whlch they were familiar, notably Anglo-Amerlcan common-law 
C O U ~ ~ S . ~ ~ ~ ~  
Although the record IS not strikmgly clear, there are some sug- 
gestions of the Framer's understanding. Professor White argues 
that the Framers believed both that abstract natural rlghts limited 
government power and that citlzens had to be protected from the 
state by the elites, one of whlch was the j ~ d i c r a r y . ~ ~ ~  Certamly, co- 
lonlal Amerlca was accustomed to the English common-law system, 
even to the point that colonlal magistrates were reluctant to create 
a great body of written law because it would restran them discre- 
t i ~ n . ~ l ~  James Madison recognized that separatlon of powers did 
not require complete separatlon of the three branches; rather it re- 
qulred only that no branch exerclse the whole power of an0ther.2~~ 
Professor Wills observes that both Madison and Hamilton were 
willing to depart from the pure doctrlne of separatlon of powers if 
efficiency or convenience Indeed, Wills takes the po- 
sition that the Framers' tmn concepts of checks and balances and 
214. Note, The Federal Common Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1512, 1513 (1969). 
215. Eshdge, Dynamzc Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1499 
(1987). Professor Eskndge also notes that "the structure of the Constitution, the apparent 
expectations of the Framers, and two hundred years of Supreme Court practice establish the 
authority of federal courts to make law, subject to legislative override. Nor does t h ~ ~  under- 
cut the constitutional precept of 'separation of powers.' " Id. a t  1500. 
216. See generally Brown, supra note 5 (discussmg New Ene doctme). 
217. Id. a t  623 (footnote omitted). 
218. See White, Reflections on the Role of the Supreme Court: The Contemporary 
Debate and the 'Lessons' of History, 63 JUDICATURE 162, 170-71 (1979). 
219. See P. REICH, ENGLISH COMMON LAW IN THE EARLY AMERICAN COLONIES 12 (1970). 
220. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, a t  325-26 (J. Madiion)(J. Cooke ed. 1961). Similarly, 
Professor Eskrldge argues, "Histoncal scholarsh~p suggests that our constitutional system of 
government was not meant to be one of rigd separation of powers or pure majoritarianlsm." 
Eskndge, supra note 215, a t  1498. 
221. See G. WILLS, EWLAINING AMERICA: THE FEDERALIST 110 (1981). 
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of separation of powers are a t  odds with each other because effec- 
tive checks are not possible under a system of complete 
separation.222 
Alexander Hamilton regarded the judiciary as more than a fo- 
rum through which the legislature speaks: "Laws are a dead letter 
without courts to expound and define their true meaning and oper- 
a t10n."~~~ Hamilton's use of "define" is inexplicable if he saw the 
role of the courts as no more than restating, in the context of par- 
ticular cases, the nation's statutes. Hamilton, however, cautioned 
that the judicial power, because of its weakness, had to be kept 
separate from the legislative and executive powers.224 At the same 
tune, he recognized that there was room for judicial judgment 
about the meaning and operation of statutes and argued that it 
was appropriate for courts to make policy choices when confronted 
with conflicting laws.226 
Hamilton's thesis is inconsistent with the argument that the 
judiciary should do no more than give effect to legislative intent, 
express or implied. Although one could create Hamilton's rule of 
interpretation on the basis of implied legislative intent, that is not 
the basis he chose. He described the rule as judicial decision-mak- 
ing, not judicial compulsion under the doctrine of separation of 
powers. For Hamilton the judiciary was not limited to spealung the 
legislative mind. Indeed, discussing judicial mdependence, Hamil- 
ton expected the judiciary on occasion to oppose the will of the 
222. See zd. at  119. 
223. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, a t  143 (A. Hamilton)(J. Cooke ed. 1961). 
224. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, a t  522-24 (A. Hamilton)(J. Cooke ed. 1961). Hamil- 
ton vlewed the judiciary as the "least dangerous" branch of government because i t  had 
neither the power of the purse nor of the sword. See zd. at  522-23. 
225. See zd. at 525-26. Hamilton argued: 
It not uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes existing at one time, clashmg 
m whole or m part with each other, and neither of them contammg any repealing 
clause or expression. In such a case, i t  is the provlnce of the courts to liquidate and 
fix their meanmg and operation: So far as they can by any fau construction be recon- 
ciled to each other; reason and law conspre to dictate that t h  should be done. 
Where t h ~ ~  is mpracticable, it becomes a matter of necessity to eve effect to one, m 
exclusion of the other. The rule whlch has obtamed m the courts for determmmg 
their relative validity IS that the last m order of time shall be preferred to the first. 
But t h  IS mere rule of construction, not denved from any positive law, but from the 
nature and reason of the thmg. It IS a rule not enjomed upon the courts by legdative 
provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and propriety, for the 
direction of them conduct as interpreters of the law. They thought it reasonable, that 
between the mterfermg acts of an equal authority, that whch was the laat mdication 
of its will, should have the preference. 
Id. 
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legi~lature.2~~ 
When the Constitution was being considered for adoption, 
most discussion about the judiciary did not deal with the legiti- 
macy and scope of federal judges' interaction with legislation. 
Loms Boudin explaned: "[Tlhe subject of the Judiciary as a whole 
was discussed very little in [the Constitutional] Convention. And 
whenever it was discussed, the discussion related to . the struc- 
ture of the Judiciary, the question of inferior federal courts, the 
tenure of office of federal judges, and smilar matters."227 The Fed- 
eralist essays support that focus of discu~son.2~~ On balance, 
"[h]istorical evldence is too scanty for one to infer that the 
Constitution restricts the scope of the federal common law."229 
The courts known to the Framers were common law courts. 
Therefore, as one author writes: 
Before the creation of the federal union, the term "judicial Power" 
could only have referred to the lund of power that state courts and 
fore~gn national courts possessed. These courts were supposed to 
create common law; m 1789, this was theu prune function. T h s  
function was not even thought to mvolve the "makmg" of law but 
merely its exposition, and thus i t  lay at the heart of the role of the 
judic~ary [A] good starting point for the study of the federal 
common law might be the premlse that m delegating to the federal 
courts a judicial power, the Constitution delegated the same type of 
power that state courts possess.2g0 
Moreover, the prevalence of common law courts supports an infer- 
ence that the Framers and the members of the first Congress in- 
tended federal courts to function smilarly As the Supreme Court 
226. Hamilton explamed t b  position: 
But i t  is not with a mew to infractions of the constitution only that the mdependence 
of the judges may be an essential safeguard a g m t  the effects of occasional ill 
humours m the society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the mjury of the 
prlvate nghts of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and partial laws. Here also 
the firmness of the judicial maptracy 1s of vast mportance m mitigating the sever- 
ity, and co-g the operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the m- 
mediate muchefs of those whch may have been passed, but i t  operates as a check 
upon the leplative body m passmg them; who, perceiving that obstacles to the suc- 
cess of an miquitous Intention are to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are 
m a manner compelled by the very motives of the mjustice they mediate, to qunlifv 
theu attempts. 
Id. at 528. 
227. L. BOUDIN, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 88 (1932). 
228. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST Nos. 80-82, at 534-57 (A. Hamilton)(J. Cooke ed. 
196l)(ducussmg liberal role of judiciary m tnpartite system of government). 
229. Note, supra note 214, a t  1515. 
230. Id. a t  1515-16 (footnotes omitted). 
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has instructed in other contexts, one does not lightly mfer radical 
change from enduring practice.231 In the absence of a specific, 
clearly expressed mtention to change the established order, change 
should not be mferred. Thus, the New Erze doctrine finds little 
support in American political thought of the late eighteenth 
century 
C. Reconciling the New Erie and Artzcle 111 "Judiczal Power" 
Separation of powers as manifested m the New Erze doctrine 
and federal common-law power can co-exist. One may agree with 
Justice Powell's and Chief Justice Rehnquist's views without aban- 
donlng the historical role of the courts as partners with the legisla- 
tive branch in the lawmaking process. Legislative prlmacy does not 
connote judicial impotence. 
New Erze theorists are correct when they assert that this 
country's constitutional system contemplates that policy-making 
authority be vested in the legislative and executive branches. To 
assert that the representative branches establish policy is not, how- 
ever, to say that the judiciary has no power to create rules of law. 
It simply must do so within the policy framework that Congress 
and the President have established. There is no legitimate separa- 
tion-of-powers objection to judicial creation of a rule that furthers 
policies as reflected in the various sources of positive law-the 
Constitution and federal statutes. Further, there is nothing coun- 
termajoritarian about courts acting harmoniously with the policies 
of the representative branches. 
In some sense, any "decision," as opposed to a purely ministe- 
rial act, may involve policy considerations. If a court applies a stat- 
ute, it r e - a r m s  the policy underlying that statute. If a court finds 
a statute inapplicable, it implicitly circumscribes the reach of the 
policy 'To view policy in that way, however, robs the word of 
meanmg. Rather, policy is "[tlhe general principles by which a 
government is guided in its management of public &ms, or the 
231. See, e.g., Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332,341 (1979)("[W]e sunply are unwilling to 
believe, on the basls of such slender 'endence,' that Congress mtended by the general lan- 
guage of 9 1983 to ovemde the traditional sovereign -unity of the States!'); Tenney v. 
Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951)(''We cannot believe that Congress would unplnge 
on a tradition so well grounded m b tory  and reason by covert mcluslon m the general 
language before us."); Murdock v. City of Mempb, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630 (1875)(re- 
fusal to Infer expansion of Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction to mclude questions of 
state law from repeal of sentence limiting scope of renew). 
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legislature in its measures."232 To evaluate the federal courts' 
proper role, this definition needs to be more specific. For this pur- 
pose, policy is the general principle that informs a particular piece 
of positive law or statutory scheme.233 Policy is defined m the goals 
of the representative branches; it is the ends, not the means. 
Justice Powell's Insistence that the judiciary should not make 
policy is correct, but his and the other New Erze theorists' applica- 
tion of that prmciple is indiscrlrninate and 0verblown.2~~ To forbid 
federal courts to create public policy is appropriate, but to forbid 
them to assist in the implementation of legislative policy takes the 
doctrine too far.236 One of the Court's most emphatic statements 
about the limitations of judicial power supports this distinction: 
[I]t is the exclusive provlnce of the Congress not only to formu- 
late legdative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also 
to establish thelr relative prlority for the Nation. Once Congress, ex- 
ercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of priorities m a 
even area, it is for the Executive to admmister the laws and for the 
courts to enforce them.236 
Justice Powell took an extremely broad mew of what consti- 
tutes policymaking in Cannon v. Unrverszty of Chzcag0.2~~ In his 
wew, judicial recognition of any right, defense or mode of proce- 
dure not provlded specifically by the legislature constitutes poli- 
~ y m a k i n g . ~ ~ ~  Thus, if the legislature did not prowde that a specific 
event should occur, judicial action causing the event is 
illegit1mate.2~~ 
While the New Erze advocates' assertion that the judiciary 
should not create policy is correct, the subtle mutation of that sep- 
232. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 603 (5th ed. 1983). 
233. For example, the legislative policy underlying Title M IS to avold or .eradicate 
discrunmation m education programs on the basis of gender. See 20 U.S.C. 8 1681 (1990). 
234. See supra note 43 and accompanymg text. 
235. Judiclal lethargy m the face of clearly expressed congressional policy may itself 
be an evlaceration of the mtent of legulation, thus molating separation of powers. 
236. Tennessee Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,194 (1978). Justice Powell explicitly 
subscribed to this statement. See Cannon v, Umversity of Chlcago, 441 U.S. 677, 744-45 
(1979)(Powell, J., dissenting)(quoting Tennessee Valley Auth., 437 U.S. at 194). 
237. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
238. See zd. at  730-49 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
239. Justice Powell IS smgled out here only because he was the first Jytice to articu- 
late the New Ene doctrme. He certrunly IS not the only member of the Court to have ex- 
pressed such mews. See supra notes 44-54 and accompanymg text (Justice Rehnqulst); 
supra notes 113-37 and accompanymg text (Justice Brennan); supra notes 160-76 and ac- 
companymg text (Justice Scalia); supra notes 177-95 and accompanymg text (Justice Ste- 
vens); supra note 196 (Justices Rehnqwt, Marshall, Blackmun, O'Connor and White). 
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aration-of-powers principle into a statement that "[judicial] power 
does not encompass the making of substantive law" is The 
constitutional scheme of separation of powers is not transgressed 
provided the judiciary's creation of substantive rulds is limited to 
those furthering a specific policy found m positive law.241 The ap- 
propriate standard is not whether the judiciary has created new 
rules, but whether those rules can be traced to policy expressed 
with some specificity m either the Constitution or federal stat- 
u t e ~ . ~ ~ ~  Thus, Professor Merrill's assertion that judicial creation of 
common law is appropriate only when there is an express or im- 
plied delegation of lawmaking power is too re~tr ic t iv;e .~~~ The fed- 
eral courts must have such power if the constitutional scheme is to 
function effectively. At the other extreme, Professor fEskridge9s vi- 
sion of dynamic judicial interpretation goes too far in its willing- 
ness to permit the judiciary to make fundamental policy choices on 
the basis of the "evolutive context."244 The federal courts should 
not be the initial reflectors of societal values that ordinarily are 
expressed in positive law. If a statutory scheme has become out- 
dated by social evolution, the representative branches, not the 
courts, must change the scheme.245 
240. Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
241. Professor Field argues that the authority for creating common law stems from 
positive law and from the necessity of an authoritative source to confer on the federal courts 
the power to create common law. See Field, supra note 17, at 927-29. Thus, Professor Field 
seems to contemplate an mplied delegation of law-malung power from Congress or the Con- 
stitution. On the somewhat broader new of t h s  Article, however, such mplication is 
necessary. 
242. Moreover, there is always the safety-valve. Congress may overrule judge-made 
law whch it  believes msconceives the present underlying federal policy or whlch it  subse- 
quently decides is unme. The leplature, however, should not be placed m the position of 
havlng to exercise a veto over a free-rangmg judiciary. See Merrill, supra note 17, a t  22 & 
nn.91-93. There is a fundamental institutional dierence between a judiciary that creates its 
own policy, leavlng the leplature to veto, and a judiciary that endeavors to mplement 
legslative policy and m the course of domg so, makes occas~onal mistakes. The former is 
illegitimate, i t  nolates separation-of-powers prmciples. The latter presents no more of a 
problem than when courts mismterpret statutes. There, i t  is left to the legulature to correct 
the error, but the error is not thus transformed mto a constitutional nolation. As Professors 
Weston and Lehman observe, "Every time a court muconstrues an act of Congress, it makes 
law that Congress does not want made; yet it hardly seems useful to say that the court is 
thereby also usurpmg the lesslative power of Congress!' Westen & Lehman, supra note 95, 
at 341. 
243. See Merrill, supra note 17, a t  70-72. 
244. Eskridge, supra note 215, a t  1538. 
245. Dean Calabresi's idea that courts should overrule outdated statutes is unmse. See 
G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 19-26 (1982). Our constitutional 
scheme does not entrust such unrestramed discretion to the judiclal branch nor does i t  con- 
template the judiciary as the appropriate body to determme whether a particular measure is 
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Thls view of separation of powers does not offend the Rules of 
Decision That Act, as Professor Redish has asserted, cir- 
cumscribes the reach of federal law, but it does not limit state law 
displacement "to those speczfic instances in which Con- 
gress-rather than the federal judiciary-chooses 'to do so."247 Re- 
garding "specifics," the Rules of Decision Act looks to macro ef- 
fects of the creation of federal law, not the micro effects. When 
Congress occupies an area, federal courts should be partners in giv- 
ing the occupation scope, not in ways that diverge from congres- 
sional policies, but m ways consistent with the statutory structure. 
Indeed, Professor Redish's "specific instances"  vie^ places on Con- 
gress an mtolerable burden of comprehensiveness and specificity 
This Article offers an approach that does not leave the Rules of 
Decision Act without function; that Act directs the federal courts 
to avoid creating common law in areas that Congress has not en- 
tered. An overwew of the areas of law prewously discussed demon- 
strates how this proposed standard works. 
Implied rights of action, whether from statutes or constitu- 
tional prowsions, do not inherently wolate separatron of 
In Cannon v. Unzverszty of Chzcag0,2*~ for example, the majority 
argued persuasively that Congress understood and intended that 
there be private rights of action under Title M.260 Irrespective of 
that understanding, it certamly is consistent with the legislative 
goal of eliminatmg sex discrimination for the Court to imply a pri- 
vate right of action. Under the standard proposed by t h ~ s  Article, 
even the four-factor test of Cort v. Ash261 is too restrictive. The 
appropriate standard for impylng private rights of action is found 
outdated. That m a qwntessential policy decmion. 
246. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). 
247. Redish, supra note 64, a t  766 (emphasm added). 
248. For these purposes, actions lmplied under statutes are not dimtingushed from 
actiom lmplied under constitutional provisions. The only difference m the positive law 
source that establishes the policy. The author agrees with Professor Brown's suggestion that 
the standards for the two types of lmplication seem to be mergmg, but urges that the 
Court's evolvlng standards are overly restrictive and will have the effect of mhibiting, rather 
than effectuating, policy decmions made by the people's representatives. See Brown, supra 
note 17, a t  295-98. 
249. 441 U.S. 677 (1979). 
250. See td. at 703. 
251. 422 U.S. 66 (1975). Cort's four-factor test m: (1) Does the statute create a federal 
right m favor of p h t i E ?  (2) Is there any Indication of legdative lntent to create such a 
remedy or to deny one? (3) Is it  consmtent with the leg-dative scheme to lmply such a 
remedy for plamtiff? (4) Is the cause of action one traditionally relegated to state law' See 
d at 78; see ako supra note 38 and accompanymg text (Cort test as stated by the Court). 
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in Texas & Paczfic Railway Company v. R i g ~ b y - ~ ~ ~  a person In- 
tended to be benefitted by the statute has a private rlght of actlon 
for Injury when the statute has been v ~ o l a t e d . ~ ~ ~  Implied rlghts of 
actlon, therefore, are consistent with respect to separation of pow- 
ers and the leglslatlve role in l aw~nakmg .~~~  
The abstention doctrines, however, do not fare as well as im- 
plicatlon of private remedies under the proposed standard.255 The 
abstentlon doctrmes, unlike Implied private actlons, do not further 
specific statutory or constitutional policies. Indeed, abstention doc- 
trines automatically involve a clash between the proper policymak- 
ing branch, the Congress, and the abstentlon policy-maker, the ju- 
diclary Before abstention will be in Issue, jurisdiction over the 
subject matter must exist. For all the abstentlon doctrines, Con- 
gress already has expressed, through its jurisdictional grants, poli- 
cies that particular classes of cases should be heard m the federal 
252. 241 U.S. 33 (1916). In Rigsby, the Court stated: 
A disregard of the command of the statute IS a wrongful act, and where i t  results m 
damage to one of the class for whose especlal benefit the statute was enacted, the 
nght to recover the damages from the party m default 1s mplied, according to a 
doctnne of the common law: "So, m every case, where a statute enacts or prohib- 
its a thmg for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute 
for the h g  enacted for hls advantage, or for the recompense of a wrong done to h m  
contrary to the s ad  law." Thm IS but an application of the maxlm, Ubr ]us ibr 
remedium. 
Id. a t  39140 (citations omitted). 
253. See rd. at 38-41. 
254. It would be anomalous to deny federal courts the power to mply prlvate nghts of 
action because of separation-of-powers problems. It IS commonplace that unless a federal 
statute makes federal jurisdiction exclusive, federal clams can be brought m the state 
courts. There IS no Inherent mpediment, therefore, m state courts mplylng prlvate nghts of 
action m federal statutes othemse properly before them. Certamly, the separation-of-pow- 
ers doctrme presents no hurdle. Several state courts have considered a request that a pn- 
vate nght of action be mplied m a federal statute. Although mplication was denied m each 
case, i t  was denled on the merits of the critena for such mplications,, not because the state 
courts thought they lacked the power to mply a pnvate action m an appropriate case. See, 
e.g., City of Tucson v. Supenor Ct. of Pima County, 127 Arm. 205,619 P.2d 33,36 (Ct. App. 
1980)("Based on the critena established by the Court m Cort v. Ash we conclude that a 
pnvate remedy was not mplicit m the [Comprehensive Employment Trammg Act]!'); 
Mann v. Oppenhemer & Co., 517 A.2d 1056,1066 (Del. 1986)("Because we find no mtent to 
create a pnvate remedy m either the statutory language or the 1eg.tslative hmtory of the 
[Securities Exchange Act of 19341, we must deny a prlvate cause of action."); Ayala 
v. Jamtuca Sav. Bank, 121 Misc. 2d 564, 468 N.Y.S.2d 306, 309 (Sup. Ct. 1983)("From a 
revlew of the [disclosure] regulation and its enabling statute [Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation Act], no prlvate nght of action can be mplied."); R.B.J. Apartments, Inc. 
v. Gate City Sav. &'Loan Ass'n, 315 N.W.2d 284, 289 (N.D. 1982)rThe failure of Congress 
expressly to provlde a prlvate remedy ordinarily mdicates an intent on its part to not make 
such a remedy available."). 
255. See supra notes 66-78 and accompanymg text (explrunmg abstention doctrmes). 
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courts. The federal courts have created the abstention doctrines to 
further what they believe are worthy policy goals-goals that inva- 
riably conflict with the grants of junsdiction. As Professor Redish 
pointed out: 
If Congress Intended that the federal courts exercise a partlcu- 
lar junsdiction, either to acheve substantive legislative ends or to 
provlde a constitutionally-contemplated jurisdictional advantage, a 
court may not, absent constitutional objections, repeal those juns- 
dictional grants. But one may question why, if the courts do not 
possess the institutional authority to repeal the leg~slature's jurisdic- 
tional scheme, they possess any greater authority to modify the 
scheme m a manner not contemplated by the legdative body.266 
There is no identifiable source for the abstention doctrmes m the 
Constitution or federal statutes. Abstention represents judicial 
policymaking without a clear textual anchor in positive law.267 As 
such, a supporter of the New Erze doctrine should disavow the ab- 
stention d o ~ t r m e s . ~ ~ ~  
The statute of limitation cases are more difficult to character- 
ize. Judicially created limitations per~ods, whether borrowed from 
state or other federal statutes, do not conflict directly with clear 
congressional policy. On the other hand, Congress obmously under- 
stands the concept of limitations.269 Its failure, therefore, to pro- 
mde a limitation may indicate that either state law should be used 
or Congress mtends no limitation to apply Because hamng no limi- 
tations period on civil actions would be unusual, a court may infer 
that Congress intended some limitations period to exist. If so, fed- 
eral courts do not violate separat~on of powers when they select a 
limitations period, whether borrowed from state or federal stat- 
utes, that is consistent with the policy of the statute that creates 
the cause of action. 
Nor does Federal preemption run afoul of separation of pow- 
256. Redish, supra note 70, a t  76-77. 
257. Chef Justice Marshall referred to both usurpation of jurisdiction and declinmg of 
granted junsdiction as "treason to the constitution." Cohens v. Virgma, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 
264, 404 (1821). 
258. Professor Redish also noted the mconslstency m some of the Justices' positions 
on judicial lawmalung. Charactermg Chef Justice Burger, Chef Justice Rehnqwst and 
Justices Powell and O'Connor as great supporters of abstention, and noting thew opposition 
to Implied rlghts of action generally, Professor Rediih observes that "[ilf the four Justices 
applied the same rigorous [separation-of-powers] analysls to the lssue of judge-made absten- 
tion, they would be requved to alter drastically thew support of such judicial power." Red- 
lsh, supra note 70, a t  82 11.58. 
259. See supra notes 132-34 and accompanying text. 
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ers, even though Congress rarely calls for it expressly 2e0 It IS diffi- 
cult to conceive that preemption of state law IS inconsistent with 
the substantlve policy underlying the federal law. Therefore, courts 
should freely apply preemptlon when they find that the statutory 
scheme requires it. Congress cannot possibly anticipate all state 
legislation. If the courts cannot help define preemptlon, Congress 
IS faced with the choice of either explicitly preempting all state 
law, thus unnecessarily Intruding into the states' domzuns, or of 
compromising the effectiveness of federal legislation. The Court's 
recognition of the three-branch preemption doctrine avolds thls di- 
lemma.261 Were courts to act othermse, separation of powers would 
be undermined by the courts' Implicit refusal to allow the federal 
legislation full scope. 
All the areas in which federal common law traditlonally ex- 
lsted cannot be treated in the same manner. Much of admlralty 
law, for example, IS judge-made; there IS no discernible admlralty 
policy in positlve law.262 The Constitution merely commits adml- 
ralty and maritlme jurisdiction to the federal courts. Congress has 
enacted some statutes on substantlve admiralty law26S but has left 
the courts without policy direction for creatlng most of the law to 
govern admlralty Thus, constitutional and congressional default 
casts the federal courts In the role of policy-makers. While the 
Courts' efforts are not inconsistent with positive law, there is not a 
positlve law anchor. Separation of powers, if not directly offended, 
IS a t  least substantially embarrassed. 
In labor and antitrust law, however, the result IS different. 
Here, Congress has provlded policy gudelines-albeit In broad 
terms. The very breadth of those guidelines and the necessity for 
that breadth underscores why it is appropriate to regard federal 
courts as havlng substant~al common-law powers. In the antitrust 
area, Congress realized that it could not provlde a statutory 
scheme that would cover the myriad ways In whlch trade mlght be 
restrzuned. Accordingly, the Sherman Antitrust merely ex- 
presses the congressional policy agalnst monopolizat~on, implicitly 
leavlng the federal courts to Implement that policy Thls IS an ap- 
proprlate relationsh~p between the branches and does not vlolate 
260. See supra notes 84-87 and accompanymg text. 
261. See supra note 87 and accompanymg text. 
262. See supra notes 88-91 and accompanymg text. 
263. See, e.g., Death on the High Seas Act, 46 U.S.C. app. 88 761-67 (1988); Jones Act, 
46 U.S.C. app. 5 688 (1988). 
264. 15 U.S.C. $8 1-7 (1988). 
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separation of powers: policymaking remans in the legislature and 
the courts actively participate in its implementation. 
The "unique federal mnterest" cases are the most difficult to 
reconcile with the New Erte doctrme. The doctrine of Clearfield 
Trust v. Untted States-federal courts may create common law if 
a unique federal interest is a t  stake-has been long a~cepted .2~~ 
Yet, accepting arguendo the Court's rationale for the rule-the 
need for uniform federal law-there still is no body of positive law 
upon which to base it. The Clearfield majority's need for uniform- 
ity apparently escaped Congress' attention.2e6 The expressed policy 
was the Court's, not Congress'.267 Had the Court refraned from 
creatmg federal law m Clearfield, Congress might have been struck 
by the impracticability of state law governing the particular area 
and then would have enacted appropriate legislation. But, the need 
had not yet been felt by the policymaking branches of the federal 
government, and, therefore, the Court should not have imple- 
mented its policy in the absence of congressional action. 
The Court's creation of a new federal defense in Boyle v. 
Unzted Technologtes C ~ r p . ~ ~ ~  demonstrates concretely the 
problems created by the Court's acting under the nebulous 
"unique federal interest" standard. The Boyle majority expressed 
a substantive policy goal-that the government's ability to con- 
tract should not be impeded by contractors' fears of civil liabil- 
ity-that was reasonable but there is no positive law embodiment 
of such a policy 26e In addition, as Justice Brennan pointed out in 
h s  dissent, on SIX prior occasions Congress had declined to enact 
measures that would have protected government ~ontractors.2~~ 
Thus, the majority's position in Boyle directly contradicted re- 
peated legislative decismons not to protect goverment contractors. 
The Court's articulation of the uniquely federal interest stan- 
dard leaves each Justice to determine, without congressional policy 
guidance, when a federal mterest is strong enough to warrant dis- 
265. 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See supra notes 99-102 and accompanymg text (diicussmg 
Clearfield Trust). 
266. See Clearfield Trust, 318 U.S. at 367. 
267. The "act of state doctrine" from Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 
398, 427-28 (1964), can also be charactenzed as the Court's policy and not Congress' See 
supra note 103 and accompanymg text. 
268. 487 U.S. 500 (1988). See supra notes 104-11,182-84 and accompanymg text (dis- 
cualng Boyle). 
269. See Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511-13. 
270. See td. at 522-25 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See supra notes 112-19 and accompa- 
nymg text (diicussmg Justice Brennan's Boyle dissent). 
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placement of state law. The Court creates for itself a standardless 
standard, and therefore opens the door for the analytical problems 
that confront the Justices today The Justices do not agree either 
among or withm themselves about when federal interests are 
unique with respect to a particular case or about the broader and 
more important question of when, if ever, it is appropriate for the 
federal courts to make law. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The largest problem today with respect to federal common law 
and the New Erze wew of separation of powers is the indiwdual 
Justices' doctrmal inconsistency Condemnation of judicial law- 
making m one case, juxtaposed with the creation of substantive 
rules of decision in another is a form of mtellectual dishonesty 
When all of the Court's members join in the practice, it bears out 
Professor Beermann's cyniclsm that the Court's members are pur- 
sumg their own policy agendas and using the New Erze doctrine as 
a tool, not as a principle.271 Without so intending, the Just~ces si- 
lently assert that the end justifies the means. Such an approach to 
the law is inconsistent with our constitutional structure. The Con- 
stitution certainly is concerned with the appropriate ends of gov- 
ernment, but the Framers' primary concern was with the means 
through which governmental power would be exercised. They m- 
tended that power be exercised in a prmcipled way When deci- 
sional rules are manipulated rather than followed, the law suffers. 
It becomes not a statement of evenly applied rights and duties, but 
the government's zpse dixzt. As Justice Scalia polnted out m an- 
other context, "[ilt is in fact comfortmg to witness the reality that 
he who lives by the zpse dixit dies by the zpse dixzt. But one must 
grieve for the Consti tut~on."~~~ 
Neither the New Erze doctrine nor the routine creat~on of fed- 
eral common law is illegitimate.273 It is inappropriate for federal 
courts to make mde-rangng policy choices. The courts' limitations 
in the area of making policy, however, do not mandate that they 
should be less than vlgorous m carrymg out, with all of the tools a t  
the disposal of the judiciary, policies properly decided upon by the 
271. See Beermann, supra note 14, at 1049. 
272. Momson v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988)(Scalia, J., dissenting). 
273. Judge Friendly argued that the origmal Ene doctnne could co-eust with federal 
common law. See Fnendly, supra note 17, at 421-22. The New Ene also can co-eust with 
federal common law provlded that both the doctnne and the scope of federal common law 
are properly understood and not artific~ally da ted .  
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representative branches. Federal common law exists and should 
exist to implement the Constitution and federal statutes.274 One 
can defend a polar statement of the New Erte doctrine-that the 
federal courts should never make law-although such a position is 
not justified historically. Similarly, one can defend the opposite 
pole-that the federal courts are true common-law courts, uncon- 
straned except by the Constitution-though perhaps with more 
difficulty, because such a mew sets the courts and Congress perma- 
nently a t  odds. Those positions, a t  least, have the mrtue of 
consistency. 
The only position that is indefensible is a decisional rule of 
convenience that allows a Justice to assume one set of colors when 
useful to support a deslred outcome and a different set when the 
first is no longer needed. Surely, different Justices may present 
themselves in different colors, but each indimdual Justice's color 
should, from day to day, be the same, or a t  least undergo only 
principled and articulable evolution. There is no place for juridical 
chameleons on the Court. 
274. See D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447, 472 (1942)(Jackson, J., 
concumng). 
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